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The present study examined the development of guilt and shame in preschool
children, as well as individual differences related to the expression of these emotions.
Sixty-one children in three age groups were videotaped in a mishap paradigm in which an
experimentally manipulated doll's arm fell off during play. Children were randomly
assigned to either an ambiguous or a personal responsibility condition. Videotapes were
coded for behavioral (e.g., latency to repair, avoidance) and affective (e.g., joy,
tensionlwony) reactions. Individual differences were assessed through parental reports
using the My Child (Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putman, 1994) and teacher
ratings using the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation Inventory (SCBE;
LaFreniere, Dumas, Capuano, & Dubeau, 1992).
As expected, 4-year-olds expressed fewer avoidant behaviors such as toy
avoidance, experimenter avoidance than did 2 or 3-year-olds. Additionally, older
preschoolers expressed more guilt-relevant emotions such as sadness and decreased joy,

rather than shame-relevant emotions such as tension/worry, which were seen in younger
preschoolers. Results of the responsibility manipulation were contrary to hypotheses.
Children in the personal responsibility condition expressed more shame-relevant
emotions and behaviors than did children in the ambiguous responsibility condition.
Results of the guilt and shame classification received only partial support, as
children were dichotomized according to avoidant behaviors. Results suggest that the
avoidance reflects shame-prone responding in children, as shame is conceptualized as
avoidant behavior and affective discomfort. Nonavoiders may not fully reflect guilt, as
the groups were dichotomized by avoidance but not by reparations. Results suggest that
nonavoiders may reflect at least a child's proneness to guilt, as nonavoiders were higher
than avoiders in guilt-relevant reactions such as latency to repair. Additionally, the
avoidanthonavoidant classification was related to age. However, responsibility
manipulations did not relate to the avoidant classification as expected. Individual
differences were associated with the nonavoidantlavoidant classification, reflecting guilt
and shame-prone responding. Nonavoiders, in comparison with avoiders, were rated by
teachers as more socially competent, and by parents as higher in affective discomfort after
wrongdoing. These findings may suggest that shame developmentally precedes guilt, but
that these emotions also reflect important individual differences in social and emotional
functioning .
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Early investigations of self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, and
embarrassment relied primarily on theoretical explanations of their importance and
potential harm to the human psyche. Most notable among these early theories is Freud's
(1 925Il974) notion that guilt emerges from the development of the superego. Beyond his

early explorations of guilt, self-conscious emotions have received little theoretical or
empirical investigation. Research in the development of emotions and emotional
expressions in children has consistently emphasized the emergence of increasingly
complex skills and understanding. Intensive research efforts have been aimed at the
"basic emotions" such as anger and joy. Until recently, few researchers have investigated
the self-conscious emotions, and therefore less is known about their developmental
course or correlates. Our understanding of emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, envy,
and embarrassment comes more from folk wisdom than from research. Although it was
once thought that any study of emotion was inherently problematic and therefore best left
to the world of literature and poetry, the self-conscious emotions have only recently
emerged from this stigma (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Tangney, 1995, 1998). The
discrepancy between our knowledge of the basic and self-conscious emotions may come
in part from our ability to study and isolate these affective states. Basic emotions, such as
joy, are particularly easy to identify and record. But how do we identify and isolate an
expression of guilt? Researchers have been grappling with the issue of measurement ever
since Freud's early theory.

Formerly, these emotions were operationalized in such a way that it was difficult
to distinguish guilt from other emotions, particularly shame. More recent theories
emphasize the need to differentiate guilt from shame; with the former requiring an
assessment of the action as being a violation whereas the latter requires that the self be
viewed as faulty (e.g., Sroufe, 1995; Tangney, 1998; Weiner, 1986). With these more
easily operationalized theoretical constructs, researchers have become less reluctant to
investigate these emotions. Still, plotting the developmental course and consequences of
guilt allows for a richer understanding of the emotional lives of children.
Significance of Studying Guilt
In examining the emergence of guilt and its differentiation from shame, we are

assuming that these emotions have some degree of impact on a child's current or future
functioning. Little is known about the importance of these emotions, however, because
they are so difficult to study (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998). Although there are many
theoretical explanations of how guilt and shame differ, and of their differential correlates,
we are unable to say when these emotions become distinct, which children are more
prone to experience one emotion rather than the other, or how these emotions affect a
child's social and emotional functioning.
Definitions of Self-Conscious Emotions and Guilt
To investigate the emergence of these self-conscious emotions, it is first useful to
understand how they are distinct from the more basic emotions. Basic emotions are
defined as emotions that emerge early in life and require few cognitive abilities, are
experienced in all cultures, are easily recognizable, and have a clear biological component
such as the production of distinct facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard &

Malatesta, 1989). In contrast, self-conscious emotions emerge later in life and require
increased cognitive capacities. This class of emotions is produced when the self is
compared to some standard or when the self is viewed from another person's perspective
(Lewis, 1993; Stipek, 1995). For example, guilt requires that children be aware that they
exist as a separate entity such that they have their own actions and intentions. In addition,
children must be able to compare their behavior to an internal standard (e.g., Lewis, 1993;
Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). As such, guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment,
envy, and empathy require the ability to be conscious or aware of the self in the social
context, and to be aware of how others may view their thoughts or behaviors.
Early theoretical investigations of guilt were made within a psychoanalytic
framework, and largely ignored its distinction from shame. For example, Freud argued
that guilt was a reaction to conflicts between the ego and the superego, but made no real
mention of shame. Later neo-Freudian theorists did differentiate these two emotions by
retaining the original definition of guilt but added that shame was a reaction to conflict
between the ego and the ego-ideal. Although the superego can be thought of as
conscience, the ego-ideal is characterized as a perfection of the self. As Tangney (1998)
points out, this distinction has similarities with other theories of the time and even
contemporary definitions. For example, H. B. Lewis (1971) distinguished shame and guilt
according to self and behavior focuses.
The primary definitional distinction made by most present day theorists has
retained a striking similarity to early neo-Freudian ones. Shame focuses on the failure of
the self whereas guilt focuses on the behavior or failed action. When the action is viewed
as separate from the self, the emotional reaction is not as global or devastating. When the

self is viewed as the failure, the resulting emotional experience may be felt more
intensely and chronically since it is a more global internal assault. From these emotions
come distinct behavioral responses. With shame, it is the self that is bad, rather than the
action, causing the child to hide or shrink away and not want to admit the wrongful act.
Guilt, which comes from a realization that the action rather than the self is bad, requires
the child to repair, make amends, and admit the act. Guilt then gives rise to responsibility
and fault, whereas shame brings about embarrassment and humiliation (e.g., H. B. Lewis,
1971).
The above definition of guilt would require a certain degree of cognitive
advancement, or superego development, to be truly experienced. With increasing
cognitive abilities, such as seeing the self as a separate agent, children acquire two
important aspects in the development of self-conscious emotions. First, they are able to
evaluate themselves against a standard or rule and second, they are able to judge their
personal responsibility for the action (Lewis, 1991; Saarni, Murnme, & Campos, 1998).
The cognitive egocentrism of young children may mean that they should see all actions as
their fault, and should not be able to distinguish between instances of personal
responsibility and external causes of failure. However, findings in support of this are
equivocal. Studies of children's understanding of the role of personal responsibility
suggest that it is not until middle childhood that this appreciation develops (e.g., Shorr &
McClelland, 1998; Weiner & Graham, 1989; Williams & Bybee, 1994) but observational
studies of preschoolers and toddlers show at least rudimentary displays of self-conscious
emotions (e.g., Kochanska, 1999; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997; Lewis, Alessandri,
& Sullivan, 1992).

Other theorists have moved away from the self-behavior distinction and have
instead tried to differentiate these emotions in terms of their functional significance. In
defining emotions from a functionalist perspective, guilt is experienced when the goal of
meeting internalized standards is not reached and shame results when the child fails to
reach the goal of having the respect of others and of preserving self-esteem (Barrett &
Campos, 1987). According to functionalist theory, the adaptive function of shame is not
only to act in a socially acceptable way, but also to show submission to others. In
contrast, guilt functions to encourage prosocial behavior and communicates remorse.

In order to more fully understand the distinctions made by these theories, the
remainder of the chapter reviews the major theoretical orientations used to conceptualize
guilt and its development. In addition, current research examining the developn~entof
guilt and its differentiation from the more global emotion of shame will be critically
reviewed. Studies of the development of guilt (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991)
generally conclude that children are not capable of understanding situational differences
that lead to feelings of personal responsibility until they are eight years old. As Cole,
Barrett, and Zahn-Waxler (1992) found, even toddlers are capable of displaying guilt-like
emotions. As will be seen, the difference in these estimations of children's self-conscious
emotional experiences appears to lie in the methods used to assess them. As such, in
attempting to understand the development of guilt, empirical evidence will reflect these
methodological differences. The initial sections discuss the predominant theories that
have begun to distinguish shame from guilt, and continue with a summary and critique of
the current research findings from a methodological perspective, followed by a discussion
of the specific research questions and hypotheses that theory and research have generated.

Major Theories
Several theorists have attempted to explain the development and importance of
guilt by trying to obtain a clear idea of the role of guilt in development. One widely
debated aspect of guilt concerns the point in development that children are first capable of
experiencing or displaying this emotion. In order to determine the emergence of guilt, it is
first necessary to conceptualize and define guilt as distinct from shame. The distinction
between shame and guilt is not as clear as may be thought, and research that examines
guilt sometimes actually relates to shame. Clearly, the answer to the development of guilt
relies, in part, on how guilt is defined.
Psychoanalytic Perspectives
Some of the earliest investigations of shame and guilt have come from
psychoanalytic theorists who have attempted to understand the development and impact
of this class of emotions. In Sigmund Freud's (192511974) writings, children were
described as developing the superego through identification with the same-sex parent. As
such, the child internalized the rules of society so that the superego acted as one's
conscience. Guilt was thought to be the product of a struggle between the ego and the
superego as manifested by the Oedipal conflict. Since the formation of the superego is
based on a fear of losing parental love, guilt was not clearly differentiated from shame. In
addition, the superego was not thought to develop until a child was about 6 years old and
continued to strengthen into middle elementary years. Toddlers and young preschool
children would then be incapable of experiencing guilt. According to this view, it is
clearly not until the resolution of the Oedipal conflict and the identification with the
same-sex parent that this emotion can be felt (see Tangney, 1995 for a review).

As Lazarus (1991) states, guilt and shame may be difficult to distinguish in
psychoanalytic terms since both are under the rubric of the superego. H. B. Lewis (1971)
provides the clearest thinking about these emotions, as she blended psychoanalytic theory
with a more cognitive approach. In this conceptualization, guilt emerges from a focus on
the wrongful action, whereas shame is the product of a realization of a failed self. As
such, shame reflects a global negative evaluation of the self. Shame then creates the
experience of exposure and a need to avoid the critical eye of others (real or imagined). In
contrast, guilt is not directed at the self, but rather a particular action. Therefore, guilt
produces a need to repair the misdeed in action or by brooding over how something
should have been done differently. Goldberg (1999) notes that shame and guilt have long
been confused in psychoanalytic writings, and that shame in contrast to guilt reflects "the
discrepancy between the person we seek to be and who we experience ourselves to be at
that moment" (p. 257).
Due to the ambiguities of Freudian theory in defining guilt, specific hypotheses
are difficult to generate, and especially difficult to test. One testable hypothesis is that
children should not be able to experience guilt until about the age of 6, but this does not
necessarily point to the development of the superego as the ultimate cause. In addition,
many of the behavioral characteristics of guilt are post hoc in that the clinical presentation
of various symptoms such as hostility could be interpreted as a conflict between the ego
and superego. The model of guilt presented by H. B. Lewis (197 1) does allow for
empirical validation though. Guilt can be observed in children through their reparative
actions, but also in ruminations about how things could have been done differently.
Shame would involve the need to avoid the caregiver or protect the caregiver-child

relationship. The hypotheses generated by these theories lack precision and testability,
but they do have considerable heuristic value and have been the basis for more modern
theories.
Cognitive and Developmental Theories
With the cognitive revolution in psychology, the importance of children's
thoughts became central to many aspects of development, including emotion. A variety of
cognitive capabilities have been proposed as prerequisites to the emergence of the
capacity for guilt, with most placing some importance on the notion that a child needs to
understand that his or her action was wrong. In addition, these theories view cognitions
as developing slowly, so that precursors to guilt should be apparent before full-fledged
guilt is possible.
Hoffman's Theory.
Similar to H. B. Lewis's notion that guilt arises fiom concern over one's actions,
Hoffman (1984) argues that guilt arises from the understanding that one has control over
one's actions, which develops in the preschool years, and fiom an understanding of
causality, which emerges early in development. Central to this is the notion that children
gradually come to understand the distinction of the self and other, and therefore can be
responsible for their actions. It is this understanding of responsibility that allows for the
emergence of guilt and empathy.
Hoffnlan though does not argue that guilt emerges fiom nothing to something.
Instead he posits that early precursors to guilt are seen even in infancy, as babies respond
to another person's pain. Still, it is not until the self and other are clearly delineated that
children can experience responsibility and, therefore, full-fledged guilt. In a final stage

of guilt development, Hoffman argues that children feel guilt not just from the notion that
they are responsible for another person's distress, but that they can feel guilty when they
observe another person's distress but do nothing to help. Guilt can arise from empathy,
because one feels guilty about another person's distress. Guilt then can take the form of
feelings of responsibility for one's action and inaction.
The primary hypothesis that is evident from Hoffman's theory is that there should
be a developmental progression from empathy to guilt as a sense of responsibility
increases. In particular, feeling guilty about one's inaction reflects empathic concern for
the other so a child expressing guilt would have to be capable of performing other
empathy tasks. The distinction between precursors and guilt may lie in the situations that
elicit them, with the latter capable only in situations where the child has responsibility for
the harm caused to the other person.
Attributional Theories.
Guilt and shame can also be differentiated according to the attributions that are
made about any given outcome. Weiner (1 986) argues that both shame and guilt result
from intense negative reactions to failure, but that the difference lies in the attributions
that are made. Shame results from failures that are directed at the self, and are perceived
to be uncontrollable. Guilt is a reaction to failure that is perceived to be controllable. In
addition, these emotions differ on several other dimensions. Shame requires an audience,
so the punishment is thought to be external. When a failure is thought to be due to
uncontrollable factors, such as lack of ability, the emotion experienced by others should
be pity. In contrast, guilt does not require an audience, so the punishment is internal, and
will result in anger from others. For example, some children may experience guilt about

not having studied sufficiently for an exam, whereas other children may experience
shame because they feel that they are not smart enough to do well on the exam. These
distinctions come from the child's own attributions about the source of the failure,
whether controllable, such as effort, or uncontrollable, such as ability. These attributions
result in stable action tendencies, with guilt creating a desire to repair and shame creating
helplessness and withdrawal.
With these definitional distinctions in mind, Weiner and Graham (1989) propose
that the development of these emotions follows a two-stage model. First, children
respond to situations emotionally by appraising the outcome of the event. The emotional
response that follows will be globally positive or negative. No attributions are made at
this stage, and only the valence of the outcome is considered. In the second
developmental stage of the model, children's cognitive appraisal of a situation includes
attributions of responsibility. For example, children may experience pride at having
completed a task when they have made the attribution that they, rather than another
person, was responsible for the task success. When a failure occurs, children then
consider whether it was controllable or uncontrollable. This second stage requires
advanced cognitive abilities, and therefore guilt and shame would not be expected in
young children.
Continuing with the importance of attributions, Lewis (1991) has proposed a
model of how guilt and shame develop. Lewis (199 1, 1993) argues for what he calls a
cognitive attributional theory of self-conscious emotions. Lewis argues that selfconscious emotions develop from three cognitive components: standards, rules and goals;
evaluation; and attribution of the self. This first component, the standards, rules and

goals that direct our behaviors, are socialized and internalized in early development. The
second and third components of his model are similar to Weiner's, with an evaluation of
personal success or failure, and subsequent attributions being necessary. These
cognitions produce the experience of shame or guilt. Like Weiner, Lewis argues that the
experience of shame or guilt depends on the third component of the model, or
attributions, with shame being more global and guilt more specific.
Lewis (1991) argues that guilt and shame both emerge after several cognitive
prerequisites are met. First, a child must develop objective self-awareness, often
empirically described as self-recognition. This first step typically emerges by the middle
of the second year of life. Next, children develop a set of standards, rules, and goals. For
example, by the end of the first year of life, infants are beginning to learn the rules that
govern society, and by the end of the second year have a rudimentary understanding of
good and bad actions. Finally, children must be able to infer that they are responsible for
their actions, a concept reflected in the need to separate the self and object.
According to this attributional theory, guilt and shame are not possible in children
until about 3 years old, and should develop at the same time since they require similar
cognitive skills. Following this model, several hypotheses are evident. First, children
younger than 3 years old should not be capable of exhibiting either shame or guilt
whereas children over 3 years old should exhibit both. In addition, the ability to
comprehend the significance of violating rules and standards should correlate highly with
the expression of guilt and shame. This primarily cognitive theory states that shame and
guilt have a parallel developmental course, with both emerging fiom the internalization of
rules.

Functionalist Theory.
One of the key theorists writing from a functionalist perspective, Lazarus (1991)
terms his theory cognitive-motivational-relational.The key element to this theory is that
the particular emotion that is expressed and felt comes from a unique relational meaning.
The relationship, such as the caregiver-child relationship, and the harms and benefits of
an emotion, are formed from two types of appraisals. The primary appraisal examines the
goal relevance and congruity, whereas the secondary appraisal consists of "blame or
credit, coping potential, and future expectations" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 39). As each emotion
has a particular relational meaning, each also has a unique pattern of primary and
secondary appraisals associated with it. In the case of guilt, the core relational theme
involves a moral transgression. Moral transgressions may or may not involve the
presence of another person, and may or may not have actually occurred. The key is that
the person feels that a moral imperative has been violated.
Lazarus concedes that the origins of guilt within his theory have considerable
overlap with the psychoanalytic tradition, attributional theory, and Hoffman's theory
since they all see guilt as rooted in the core relational theme of violating a moral
imperative. His conception of shame has considerable overlap in language with the
psychoanalytic tradition, as shame is conceptualized as a failure to live up to an ego ideal.
Since the ego ideal originates from the parent, a failure in front of a parent or similar
parental figure is an attack on the self and the internalized parent. Children who
experience shame feel that they are receiving criticism from an important other, so the
misdeed is a threat to the relationship. It is a fear of losing the love of the parent, or a fear
of abandonment, that drives shame. As with guilt though, the critical other does not need

to be present for shame to be experienced. So although guilt is based on a moral
transgression and shame on an internalized ideal, neither requires the presence of others.
Lazarus points out that all emotions are reactions to some social context, whether real or
imagined. The hnction of emotions as defined by Lazarus reflects an adaptation of the
individual and a response to our needs and actions as they are experienced in our social
environment. Emotions are then a complex combination of several aspects, including
cognitions and motivations.
According to Lazarus' framework, these emotions are also experienced as a result
of primary and secondary appraisals. For guilt to be experienced, the primary appraisal
would be that there is a moral transgression. This can result in anger, anxiety, guilt, or
disgust. Only if the secondary appraisal involves self-blame for the transgression will
there be guilt. Finally, a child with good coping skills will attempt to make reparations.

In contrast to theorists who discuss only the positive outcomes of guilt, Lazarus argues
that there can be negative ones if the person denies responsibility, projects it elsewhere, or
avoids thinking about the victim. Even though there is no self-blame involved, Lazarus
proposes that the person may still experience guilt.
For shame to be experienced, the primary appraisal involves a failure to reach an
ego ideal, which again can result in ang&, anxiety, shame, and disgust. If the secondary
appraisal involves blame to the self, then shame rather than guilt will be experienced. In
contrast with other theorists, Lazarus notes that there can be positive outcomes to shame.
Children with adequate coping skills, according to their own appraisal, will simply work
hqder to live up to the ideal. In addition, if the hture outcomes are thought to be
favorable, the fear of abandonment, and therefore shame, will be reduced. Most theorists

argue that since shame reflects a fear of abandonment or loss of parental love, people who
experience shame are overly concerned with this issue. In contrast, Lazarus contends that
shame should not be conceptualized in terms of these motivations, but in terms of the
relational issue and appraisals.
Barrett (1998) also argues for the role of cognition in the emergence of selfconscious emotions. Differing from others, though, she contends that emotions are only
influenced by cognition, but cannot be defined by it. Instead, emotions are defined by
their function in the environment. Barrett asserts that the cognitive prerequisites often
seen to be important to the development of guilt are present even in infants. These
prerequisites include self-recognition and a "rudimentary awareness of what they are
doing" (p. 78). She contends that although mirror recognition does not develop until 15
to 24 months, infants display these cognitive prerequisites in their empathetic crying and
in their ability to learn sucking patterns in response to their mother's voice (e.g.,
DeCasper & Fifer, 1980). Although these prerequisites are present in infants, they are
unlikely to experience guilt since they are unable to appreciate that they have deviated
from a standard. It is only through socialization that a child has a cognitive understanding
of rules and standards. Although she asserts that standards must be examined, she does
not see them as ultimately important in understanding when guilt can emerge. In contrast,
she argues that it is not the emergence of cognitive skills that is important, nor the
emergence of full-fledged guilt, but the unfolding of increasingly more contexts in which
guilt can be experienced. It is only from experience and socialization that guilt can be
experienced in a particular context. The distinction between socialization, which is

thought to be an important factor in the widening contexts of these emotions, and
internalization of rules and standards is not clear, however.
The action tendencies of guilt and shame as described by Barrett coincide with
other theorists, and are viewed in relation to their expressive function. Guilt
communicates a desire to repair the action done and repair the relationship. Barrett
asserts that there are children who rely more on shame-relevant responses whereas others
display guilt-relevant behaviors. It is not the cognitions that are the focus, but the
contexts. Developmentally, children simply show guilt-like reactions in a wider variety
of contexts (Barrett, 1998). Although as Barrett points out, there are some rudimentary
cognitive capabilities present in infants, few would argue that these nascent abilities are
likely to produce complex cognitions. Even if an infant has the ability to move a toe to
cause a mobile to move, we cannot say that the infant could then experience guilt or
shame when the string is broken. This hnctionalist perspective does raise an interesting
point, though. Although it is argued here that there are certain cognitive precursors
necessary to the experience of guilt, the idea that children will learn to feel guilty across a
wider variety of situations seems very likely. For example, a preschooler may have little
emotional reaction to not inviting a friend to a birthday party, but an adolescent might feel
guilty in a similar situation. The increase in the contexts in which guilt is expressed
should not however mean that cognitions are unimportant. There may be a point at which
guilt is experienced in a full form, in contrast to toddler experiences of guilt where it may
continue to be refined through development. In addition, Stegge and colleagues note that
guilt may be elicited in situations where one has harmed another, whereas shame may be
elicited in situations where one has not exhibited enough control over one's behavior so

that they are acting in a way inconsistent with their beliefs (Olthof, Schouten, Kuiper,
Stegge, & Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000).
Sroufe's Theory.
In contrast to Barrett's view of cognition in self-conscious emotions, Sroufe

(1995) contends that cognition, social development, and emotional development are
inseparable. For example, it is only with the emergence of the autonomous self that
negative evaluation is possible, with shame emerging before guilt. There must be a
separateness of self and others, and an understanding that people have different
intentions. The precursors apparent in toddlers come to fruition in preschoolers, who are
more directed by internal behavioral control. Whereas toddlers require adult presence to
follow rules, preschoolers are increasingly able to regulate their actions (Kopp, 1982;
Maccoby, 1984). Sroufe argues that it is the somewhat undifferentiated self that causes
the global reaction of s h a l e in toddlers. Shame results from only a basic sense of right
and wrong, and is therefore a global emotional reaction. In contrast, guilt is a more
specific reaction at having done something wrong. Therefore, although guilt is not
possible until the preschool period, it emerges from earlier prototypes, such as shame.
Guilt is differentiated from shame since it requires a more separate self and "often entails
an exact appreciation of what one has done" (Sroufe, 1995, p. 198). In addition, it is no
longer a reaction to external standards and therefore can be experienced without an
audience.
Emotional development as defined by Sroufe is based on the assumption that the
child generates the context. With shame and guilt, the context as defined by the child will
create the emotional reaction. In the case of guilt, it is the context that is scrutinized

because the actions were wrong, and this reaction is therefore more specific to that
context. This evaluation makes reparation possible. Shame, acting to attack the self, is
more like global anxiety or global ill feeling. Reparation of the relationship rather than
the actions is of primary concern. Shame is therefore not context specific. This is similar
to Weiner and Graham's (1989) theory of self-conscious emotions since both anticipate
more global emotional reactions to be precursors to later context specific ones.
Several hypotheses are apparent from Sroufe's model. First, guilt should be more
apparent in older preschoolers and should be more context specific. Younger
preschoolers should then react with more shame regardless of context. These reactions
should be visible in their specific reparation attempts with shame causing more behaviors
aimed at repairing the self or the relationship with a harmed other, whereas a child feeling
guilt should be more likely to actively try to repair, for example, a broken object.
Summary of Major Theories
With the exception of psychoanalytic theories, the theories presented above share
several common elements. First, the behavioral distinction between guilt and shame is
clearly one of action or withdrawal. Guilt is noted to be an emotion that motivates one to
repair the damage that has been done. Shame motivates the person to avoid both the
situation and the harmed other due to the fear of losing the love of the parent. These
behavioral traits are proposed in psychoanalytic theories as well, with the addition of
avoidance and projection as reactions to guilt. Second, the focus of blame clearly
distinguishes shame from guilt. For guilt to be manifested, the focus is placed on the
action, rather than the self, which is seen with shame. This relationship between the self
and shame is common across all theories, with psychoanalytic traditions simply

discussing the self in terms of the ego-ideal. Underlying these behavioral traits, though,
the theories presented above differ in the proposed genesis.of these self-conscious
emotions.
The factor that most clearly discriminates these theories is the relative emphasis
placed on cognitive, social, or intrapsychic factors as keys to the emergence of guilt.
With each particular emphasis there also comes a hypothesized age at which guilt can be
first experienced. For example, psychoanalytic theories view the development of the
superego, and its reactions to unacceptable aggressive and sexual impulses, as the driving
factor in the development of guilt. Since the superego is of primary importance, guilt is
not possible until children are about six years old. Similarly, functionalist theories view
shame as a reaction to the ego-ideal, but these theorists do not see the underlying
motivation for guilt or shame to be of primary importance. In contrast, attributional
theories, with the emphasis on cognitive development, generally propose that shame and
guilt are parallel constructs, requiring the same abilities. Accordingly, shame and guilt
should emerge at the same age, which is hypothesized to be when children are about 3
years old.
Although all of the theories presented propose that guilt cannot emerge from
nothing to something, Sroufe argues that the differentiated self, and the consequent selfcontrolled behavior, is the key developmental feature that makes guilt possible. In
contrast, shame, which involves both a global reaction and basic sense of right and
wrong, is a rudimentary precursor to guilt. With Sroufe's emphasis on self-regulation,
guilt is hypothesized to emerge from shame in the preschool years. Whether the origins
of shame and guilt as proposed by these theorists can be empirically validated remains to

be seen, but the assumption of these theories that the central issue of guilt is one of
personal responsibility, should be examined, along with the developmental progression of
the experience of guilt.
Empirical Evidence in Young Children
Since the predominant theories of self-conscious emotions focus on cognitive
development, researchers have primarily investigated the emerging understanding of guilt
and shame in older children. School-aged children increasingly differentiate shame from
guilt, are more aware of the role of personal responsibility in these self-conscious
emotions, and feel guilt or shame in different contexts. Early developmental expressions
of self-conscious emotions have only recently been investigated. The theories presented
above differ in whether guilt is possible in early childhood or not, and can develop with
or without shame. As with most fields, the answers found reflect the theory underlying
the investigation, and therefore the methods used. For example, theories that rely heavily
on cognition require a verbal understanding of guilt, whereas relational theories may
investigate expressive components of guilt. As such, the following literature review will
examine the findings in terms of the methodology used. As will be seen, the evidence of
school-aged children's increasing emotion understanding comes from interviews, whereas
the growing body of research pointing to early development of self-conscious emotions in
toddlers and preschoolers is evidenced by their emotional expressions in behavioral tests.
Hvpothetical Situations
Research examining the development of guilt and shame has primarily focused on
its emergence in elementary school-aged children. The focus on this age group is driven
in part by research suggesting that guilt and shame are not distinct until about 8 years of

age. These findings may partially result from the cognitive emphasis of the theory, as
well as the methodology used. In particular, these studies find that children's
understanding of guilt and shame does not emerge until children are able to adhere to
moral standards whether or not they are in the presence of an authority figure (e.g.,
Damon, 1988; Kagan, 1984). Using attributions of responsibility to define guilt and
shame, research suggests that children may not be capable of experiencing these emotions
until even later in childhood. The key methodology used to explore the cognitive
components of guilt and shame is through hypothetical stories. Typically, children are
presented with a story and asked to rate the degree of controllability and the emotion that
would likely be felt.
Results of research involving story characters do support cognitive-attributional
theories of guilt. In a series of studies examining the role of emotion understanding in the
development of self-conscious emotions, Weiner and colleagues have found that
children's use of attributions of responsibility does change with age (e.g. Weiner, 1985;
Weiner & Graham, 1989; Weiner, Graham, Stem, & Lawson, 1982). In one study, 10year-old children more reliably linked intentionality of story characters with emotion and
intensity, with guilt less often reported and being of lower intensity for uncontrollable
situations than for younger children (Weiner & Graham, 1989). In an additional study
investigating the use of affective cues to determine responsibility, children were read
hypothetical situations in which a child failed a test, and were then told the emotional
reaction (anger or pity) of the teacher. When asked to rate the degree that the failure was
due to low ability or poor effort, 5-year-old children did not reliably understand that a
teacher's angry reaction was due to low effort rather than low ability. The results were

especially apparent when the teacher reportedly felt pity for the child. Only the oldest age
group, 9-year-old children, reported that the teacher's reaction was due to the child's lack
of ability (Weiner et al., 1982). These findings suggest that children in early elementary
school are only just beginning to use affective cues of others to help in their causal
attributions, and that pity is linked to a lack of responsibility, and anger to responsibility.
Finally, Thompson (1989) studied the use of emotions to describe story characters by
children in second grade, fifth grade, and by college students. Although children in
second grade used global emotions such as happy and sad to describe characters, they also
reported that the characters might feel pride or guilt in response to certain situations.
These findings suggest that younger children still rely on global outcome-based
assessments, but are beginning to use attributions of responsibility to predict emotional
reactions (Thompson, 1989).
Seeing an event as controllable or uncontrollable has implications for possible
intemal causes as well. Stipek and DeCostis (1988) found that intemal causes such as
low ability, which is uncontrollable, and low effort, which is controllable, were all seen as
controllable by children under 10 years old. In addition, 9- to 13-year-old children, but
not 6- to 7-year-old children, saw failures due to low ability as capable of eliciting both
shame and guilt. If children understood the role of personal responsibility in failure, they
should view failures due to low ability as uncontrollable. Failures due to lack of effort are
controllable though, and should elicit guilt. Hypothetical failures due to low effort mostly
elicited guilt for this older group, suggesting that older children understand that guilt
results from controllable events.

Barrett's (1998) theory, which states that self-conscious emotions develop in
relation to context, has gained partial support from a series of investigations that find the
types of events that children think will elicit shame versus guilt changes with age. For
example, Ferguson and colleagues (1991) found that although children reported more
guilt to hypothetical situations involving moral transgressions than social blunders, they
reported equal levels of shame to these situations. When asked why they felt these
emotions, children reported feeling guilt principally because they had violated a norm,
especially if the act was done purposely. This guilt was accompanied by a desire to make
reparations. Children understood shame to be a result of the fear of the audience's
reaction, and therefore resulted in a desire to avoid others. In addition, when comparing
second and fifth graders, older children were better at sorting situations involving shame
from guilt. Older more than younger children reported that guilt was associated with a
desire to confess, and shame was associated with an attack on their self-concept. Finally,
younger children more often reported that both shame and guilt would result from a fear
of possible punishment and reactions from others. These findings also lend support to
theories that controllability will elicit different emotions, and that these emotions will
result in different action tendencies. In addition, although younger children rely on the
reaction of the audience for shame and guilt, these data are only designed to tap into
children's understanding of the distinction between shame and guilt, not their actual
behaviors.
One study of preschoolers' responses to hypothetical situations suggests that even
young children assess the context in whlch failures occur (Cain & Staneck, 1999). When
faced with criticism, children who had rated their hypothetical work as good reported

more negative affect, had lower global self-qualities, and reported that they were less
likely to persist at the task than those who rated their performance as poor. These children
did not differ, however, on the actual presentation of shame-like behaviors when being
told the hypothetical story. Although this may simply be a reflection of the lack of power
of a hypothetical situation to cause actual felt shame, 4- but not 5-year-old children who
displayed higher levels of shame did perform more poorly on a false-belief task. In
addition, both 4- and 5-year-old children high in shame performed more poorly on an
emotional perspective-taking task. These findings, although tentative due to the
somewhat weak effects, do suggest that preschool children prone to shame are less able to
identify the emotions of others, and are less likely to be able to take another's perspective.
Interviews
One of the drawbacks of using story characters is that the situations may not
reflect experiences that the child has had. One solution to this problem is to use freerecall or open-ended interviewing. This methodology calls for children to respond to a
semi-structured interview format that elicits memories of past emotional experiences.
Using free recall of emotions suggests an earlier understanding of the distinction between
guilt and shame than do responses to story characters. When children aged 6 to 11 were
asked to recall a situation in which they felt a particular emotion (e.g., guilt, anger, pity),
and whether the situation was controllable, even the youngest children reported that pity
resulted from uncontrollable conditions, and anger from controllable ones (Graham,
Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984). For the youngest age group, guilt was reported for
uncontrollable situations, whereas the oldest age group reported guilt for controllable
conditions. Younger children may not be aware of the importance of personal

responsibility in the experience of guilt, but this does not mean that children do not react
differentially to situations with and without personal responsibility. The results simply
suggest that children do not verbally understand these distinctions; their emotional
reactions might tell us otherwise.
Projective measures such as the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Study (1978)
have been used to tap the development of guilt. Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies
have found that young children report more guilt regardless of whether their actions were
controllable or uncontrollable than do older children. For example, although 6-year-old
children engaged in more self-blame and apology, by age 11, children reported that they
would engage in more behavior aimed at amending the action that was in their control
(Graybill, 1990). In a longitudinal study of children at first, second, and third grades
tested again 5 years later, similar results were found (Graybill, 1993). In addition, even
with the increased knowledge of the role of personal responsibility in feelings of guilt,
older children were not more likely to try to evade responsibility by blaming external
circumstances. This suggests that even as children develop an understanding that some
uncontrollable factors may effect the perception of responsibility, children were not more
likely to try to excuse behavior by blaming these external causes. Although these studies
report that these emotional reactions develop over time, the major focus is one of
understanding and cognition rather than emotion. Although 6-year-old children were not
found to distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable events, it remains unclear if
this is due to a deficit in their understanding or in their actual emotional responses.

In a study of children in middle childhood and adolescents' descriptions of
situations that made them feel guilty, several guilt elicitors changed over time. Older

children were less likely to report feeling guilty in situations in which they had no control
(Williams & Bybee, 1994). In addition, older children were more likely to mention
feeling guilty over inaction. Shorr and McClelland (1998) found that by 8 years old,
children classify lack of helping as a cause of guilt. These studies suggest that older
elementary school children have a more adult-like understanding of shame and guilt than
younger children, and that the classification of guilt and shame continue to develop into
adolescence. For example, adolescents are more likely to report guilt over internal
thoughts and feelings such as being inconsiderate, rather than external acts, particularly
externalizing behaviors (Williams & Bybee, 1994).
Finally, an examination of the antecedents and consequences of guilt and shame
suggests that children's understanding of these emotions may not be reflected in one or
two questions. Although 5- and 6-year-olds frequently said that they did not know how to
define guilt, they described different antecedents to the emotion. For example, events in
which they were aggressive or broke the rules were often cited as antecedents to guilt,
whereas exposure and evaluation failure, such as failure at a school task or being attacked
by peers, was cited as a cause for shame (Berti, Garattoni, & Venturini, 2000). It should
be noted that peer evaluation such as an attack or rebuff was also cited as antecedents to
sadness, but the authors note that the behavioral reactions to these emotions differed. For
example, with shame they mentioned a desire to hide or remove themselves from the
situation, which was not mentioned in regard to sadness. As such, it is likely that young
children do have different reactions, or action tendencies in relation to these emotions,
but do not understand the emotions themselves.

Since these studies rely on children's reports of emotional experiences, whether
with story characters or free recall, several methodological issues should be reviewed to
interpret these results. First, the focus of these studies has been on children's
understanding of attributions of responsibility and causal antecedents, not actual
behaviors. Although the authors do not try to overstate their case by arguing that
emotions such as guilt are not possible at earlier ages, it should be remembered that
emotion understanding often develops after emotion production, especially for the basic
emotions (e.g., Ackerrnan, Abe, & Izard, 1998; Denham, 1998). Second, these studies
rely heavily on the use of language. When young children report that they experience
guilt from an uncontrollable event, it may not be because guilt is an undifferentiated
reaction, but that children do not understand the semantic difference between shame and
guilt.
Parental Report
The emergence of guilt has been relatively ignored in preschoolers and toddlers
since both hypothetical vignettes and interviews are difficult to use with these age groups.
Self-conscious emotions, including guilt and shame, have been investigated with parental
report for younger children. Kochanska has studied the emergence of conscience in
toddlers and preschoolers, with affective and behavioral responses to mishaps being
influenced by both maternal socialization and temperament (Kochanska, 1993, 1999;
Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putnam, 1994). In developing a parent measure
of conscience in children, Kochanska and colleagues propose that conscience can be
classified into two orthogonal domains. The first, affective discomfort, has been defined
as guilt, arousal, and remorse associated with actual and perceived wrongdoing. Second,

behavioral control is defined as the ability to refrain from wrongdoing and control
impulses. This measure which has demonstrated adequate reliability (alphas ranging from
.59 to .93) has been used to assess developmental trends in young children's conscience
development. Kochanska and colleagues found that 3-year-old children had significantly
greater reported discomfort after wrongdoing, were more apologetic, more compliant to
rules even without adult supervision, and were more concerned over the misbehavior of
others than were 2-year-old children. However, 3-year-old children did not differ from 4
to 5-year-old children.
Between the two factors proposed, affective discomfort was found to increase
with age, was higher in girls than in boys, and was related to several temperament indices
for girls. Kochanska argues that these data suggest that 3 years of age may be a time
when a major developmental transition occurs, and may be visible as a precursor in 2year-old children. Although affective discomfort reflects the emotional responses of
preschoolers, it is difficult to determine whether developmental changes in this factor are
attributable to changes in shame or in guilt, as both emotions are assessed in this
dimension. For example, distress and guilt are assessed along with questions concerning
the child's focus on the parent-child bond rather than the damage to the object. This
second scale seems more reflective of shame responses than guilt, making the
development of these distinct affective reactions unclear from these data.
The second factor, active moral regulatiodvigilance, focuses on behavioral
responses including confession and reparation, and may be a more direct measure of the
actions of guilt, but there were limited age effects for this factor. Only internalized
behavior and concern over others' wrongdoing increased with age. The lack of findings

for guilt behaviors such as confession may not point to a developmental reason, but may
be a reflection of the use of maternal report. Mothers may be over-reporting the guilt
responses of younger children. Items in these scales primarily ask parents to report
whether their child will confess or repair damage without prompting. As Kochanska
notes, further behavioral measures are needed to explore the development of conscience
in young children, especially given the overlap in shame and guilt behaviors within
scales.
Behavioral Tests
Although parental reports may clarify issues in the early development of selfconscious emotions, tests designed to elicit various behavioral responses have ecological
validity in that they are generally more reflective of daily challenges. Using behavioral
measures, Kochanska and colleagues (1997) investigated toddler, preschool, and early
elementary school-aged children's internalization of rules (conscience) as assessed by
compliance with maternal and experimenter request when supervised and unsupervised,
and reluctance to cheat at games either alone or with peers. For example, children were
asked by their mothers to clean up an area where they had been playing, and were
observed with the mother present, and then absent. Using an aggregate score of
conscience behaviors, older children showed more internalization of rules than younger
children, and girls displayed more than boys. The authors argue that these behavioral
measures reflect internalization since children scoring higher exhibited control even when
adults or peers were not present. Assuming that self-regulation is a basis for conscience
and inhibition, the relationship between these measures of conscience and inhibitory
control was also investigated. Inhibitory control was assessed through a series of

laboratory tasks; including "Simon says," and tasks requiring slowed motor activity such
as walking a line slowly. Again, older children outperformed younger children and girls
outperfornled boys in inhibitory control. Finally, maternal reports of temperamental
inhibitory control as well as the inhibitory control measures predicted children's
conscience behaviors at all ages (Kochanska, 1999; Kochanska et al., 1997). Although
arguing for a temperament model for inhibitory control and its long-term effects on the
development of conscience, these findings hrther point to the need to examine affective
in addition to behavioral assessments of guilt and shame and their emergence in
preschool children.
Studies by Zahn-Waxler and colleagues have pointed to the role of guilt in helping
behavior. When presented with various staged distress incidents, such as an adult in need
of help, children from preschool to sixth grade showed more positive than negative affect
when helping. In turn, their actual helping was correlated positively with the attributions
of guilt among story characters that observe a victim in distress. In particular, when the
story characters were portrayed as responsible for the person in need, reporting that the
observer would feel guilt was positively correlated with actual helping. In addition,
reporting guilt to these story characters was correlated positively with positive affect and
negatively correlated with negative affect in the helping scenarios. The authors note that
guilt, rather than empathy, may motivate helping since the relationship between empathy
in story characters and helping was weaker. These findings suggest that attributions of
personal responsibility, rather than the tendency to empathize with the victim's affective
state, are related to increased helping (Chapman, Zahn-Waxler, Cooperman, & Iannotti,
1987).

Similar to guilt, the self-conscious emotions of pride and shame in preschoolers
have been of increasing interest to researchers. As with guilt, pride and shame are
notoriously difficult to measure through behavior, but there is con~pellingevidence that
these emotions can be identified. Lewis and his colleagues, who have examined
children's responses to success and failure, have led much of the research on the
development of shame. Lewis, and colleagues (1992) presented 3-year-old children with
either an easy or difficult task, and found that children who failed at a seemingly easy
task, such as putting together a puzzle with only four large pieces, displayed more shame
than when they failed at difficult tasks, and more pride when they completed a difficult
than an easy task. In addition, girls expressed more shame at task failure than did boys,
but boys and girls did not differ in expressions of pride. When comparing across the task
type, several gender differences emerged. Boys who were high in shame expressions
were also likely to show less pride. The relationship between pride and shame was
weaker for girls, with high shame responses correlated positively with high pride
expressions. Lewis and colleagues argue that these reactions were not simply global
positive and negative expressions, but also included gestural and postural features such as
erect posture (pride) or slumped, lowered head (shame) that make the distinctions clearer
in this measurement system. For example, shame was defined as "body collapsed,
comers of the mouth are downwardAower lip tucked between teeth, eyes lowered with
gaze downward or askance, withdrawal from task situation and negative self-evaluation
(i.e., 'I'm no good at this')" (Lewis et a]., 1992, p. 632). Although children may not
report understanding the different causal attributions that affect emotions, their reactions

to these various situations suggest that they make these cognitive assessments, even if
they cannot express them verbally.
The cognitive and developmental theories presented earlier all suggest that
although early childhood may be when guilt and shame are first fully experienced,
precursor expressions and experiences should be apparent in toddlers. For example,
Sroufe (1995) argues that shame may be an early global negative evaluation that precedes
the more context specific reaction of guilt. In a series of studies using responses to actual
mishaps (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; Cole et al., 1992), toddlers were capable
of experiencing shame and guilt-like reactions to everyday mishaps. These findings
contradict the notion that shame and guilt are not differentiated until much later in
development. Indeed, toddlers react to mishaps in ways that show a development towards
guilt reactions to specific events, such as personally caused circumstances.
One shortcoming of these studies is that, although two mishaps are used, neither
point to personal responsibility nor external responsibility. The cause of the mishaps is
unclear, although it is presumed that the child caused these mishaps. In addition, the
limited age-range makes developmental differences difficult to assess. If preschoolers do
have a more developed emotional reaction, then the issue of personal responsibility
should be more important to their emotional reaction to mishaps than to toddlers'
reactions. Toddlers' emotional and behavioral responses in these studies may be
precursors since parents were present throughout the situations and no attempt was made
to differentiate reactions to situations that were not the children's fault. Parental presence
may have influenced these young children to experience a global negative feeling that
may or may not have been internalized. If children were equally likely to respond with

guilt or shame in that context, then it can be argued that they are not really experiencing
guilt as it has been defined. The role of context in toddlers' emotion reactions is not
assessed in these studies, and therefore although the findings suggest that nascent
versions of guilt are present, they may give a clearer picture of individual differences.
Toddlers who react with shame versus guilt may have a constellation of other behaviors
that correspond to their tendency to blame the self.
Individual Differences
One reason that guilt is difficult to study is that no one situation will clearly elicit
guilt for all children. Indeed, some children may react to a similar situation with shame.
Although there are many possible causes for these differences in emotional style, a child's
sense of self appears to be most important. Sroufe (1995) states that an individual's
belief in others as caring and trustworthy creates a sense that the self is also caring and
trustworthy. The early responsive parenting found in infancy and the toddler years will
emerge in preschool as effective self-regulation. Early experience in the attachment
relationship allows the child to experience personal agency that develops into an ability to
regulate, as well as a confidence is one's regulatory abilities. Individual variations from
optimal development will then result in generally identifiable patterns that are expressed
as a child's coping abilities. For example, if children are forced into self-regulation
before they are developmentally ready, they will be faced with failures. These early
failures could create a global emotional response of rage and shame. In contrast to
optimal development, some children are emotionally inflexible and may feel ineffective
across situations. These early coping strategies may persist in children that are not
equipped to handle emotionally charged situations. They may react with feelings of

helplessness on one extreme, and anger and hostility on the other. For example, some
preschool children may not have a sense that "things will be all right even in the face of
challenge or stress" (Sroufe, 1995, p. 223).
Research investigating the effects of maltreatment in childhood points to how
early parenting practices can affect the emergence of self-conscious emotions. Alessandri
and Lewis (1996) found that maltreated girls showed less pride and more shame than
nonmaltreated girls. Maltreated boys showed both less pride and less shame than
nonmaltreated boys. It appears that the punitive family styles that these children
experience may affect their emerging sense of self and self esteem, but they may simply
reflect greater masking of emotion in these children. Children in average or optimal
families in contrast, may have developed a sense of self-worth because these children
genuinely believe that they are effective in their environment. In social situations, these
greater regulatory abilities will be reflected in greater social competence, empathy
towards others, and greater prosocial behavior. Thompson (1989) notes that children's
use of attributions of personal responsibility may be affected by their history so that
experiences of success or failure may influence the causal attributions made.
It seems reasonable to expect that children develop different attributional 'styles'
as a consequence of parent child-rearing practices (e.g., disciplinary procedures),
their experiences in the broader ecology of development (e.g., inner-city versus
middle-class settings), and perhaps also with their range of prior emotional
experiences and temperamental style (Thompson, 1989, p. 146).

If Sroufe's tenet that shame represents a more global and less developed emotional
reaction for preschoolers is valid, than older preschoolers that experience shame may
differ in their coping strategies from those who experience guilt.
The expression of self-conscious emotions may also be linked to the basic
emotions, which may suggest an overall coping strategy. Maternal reports of negative
affect and anger were related to a composite measure of guilt and shame even in young
children (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). In addition, behavioral measures of anger
and fear at 10 months predicted guilt in 6- and 7- year-old children, suggesting that
coping patterns do play a role in the emergence of guilt and shame. Beyond maternal
report, it is unclear how guilt and shame were defined and assessed in this study. The
correspondence to both internalizing and externalizing behaviors is likely due to shame
rather than guilt tendencies, given the relationship of guilt to empathy (e.g., Chapman et
al., 1987).
Tangney (1995) noted, "often, the term guilt is used as a catch-all phrase to refer
to aspects of both emotions" @. 1132). Shame and guilt reflect divergent styles and are
related to coping in other emotion-eliciting situations. The cognitive appraisals used in
shame and guilt may also be used in anger-provoking situations. In a sample of middle
childhood, adolescents, college students, and adults, guilt was related to constructive
coping, such as a desire to fix the situation, and lower reported aggression. Shame was
related to higher reported anger arousal, a desire for revenge, and aggressive solutions.
This pattern held true for both direct and indirect forms of aggression. Shame-prone
individuals also reported a greater tendency to hold their anger in, and to be angry with
themselves (e.g., for trusting the person). Finally, shame-prone individuals were less

optimistic about the long-tenn consequences of their anger than were guilt-prone
individuals (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Tangney and
colleagues argue that guilt-prone individuals may have more constructive methods of
dealing with their anger because they may not feel a global threat to the self that
characterizes shame. As with guilt, situations causing anger can be remedied. In
addition, guilt has been linked to greater empathy, so the ability to take another person's
perspective in an anger situation makes them less likely to view the other person as
hostile or their actions as intentional. The global nature of shame makes it a more
devastating emotion that can affect the self-esteem of the child. Guilt is more reactive to
the situation and requires remedy. With repair, the experience of guilt does not leave the
self damaged. The tendency to experience guilt rather than shame may be associated with
a constellation of positive outcomes including greater social competence, prosocial
behavior, more cooperation, and autonomy, while being lower in both internalizing and
externalizing behaviors, anger, anxiety, aggression, isolation, and dependence.
When examining the emotional reactions of toddlers to mishaps, Cole and
colleagues (1992) found that chlldren could be classified by two global emotional
responses. First, some children displayed a high degree of tension and worry, and anger.
Second, some children displayed a high degree of sadness and low levels of joy, which
were associated with more reparations. These emotional styles were associated with
maternal emotional patterns, in which lower levels of the tensiodworry and anger
dimension were associated with higher scores for maternal internalizing syrnptomatology.
The authors hypothesized that maternal anxiety and depression may inhibit these
emotional reactions. Since the mother was present during the testing, these children may

not have wanted their mothers to become concerned over the mishap, or may not have
expected her to react to their own concern. When these children were then classified into
two groups "avoiders" and "amenders," guilt-relevant responses were higher for the
latter, and shame-relevant responses were higher for the former (Barrett et al., 1993).
Further, boys were more likely to be classified as "amenders" than were girls, and girls
were more likely to be classified as "avoiders" than were boys.
Finally, the role of temperament in the development of conscience has been
investigated through maternal reports and behavioral observations. Both methodologies
reveal that efforthl control, as discussed earlier, is associated with the emergence of
guilt, with children lower in efforthl control being more likely to engage in prohibited
acts, and less likely to be remorsehl (e.g., Kochanska et al., 1997; Rothbart et al., 1994).
Again, the overlap between guilt and shame makes these data difficult to judge, but it
suggests that children who are more prosocial and exhibit fewer externalizing behaviors
would be less likely to engage in prohibited acts. In addition, these children may have
inadequate skills for coping with mishaps. Across these studies, clearly children's
tendencies to react to situations with shame or guilt has implications for the way other
situations are handled, and may therefore have an impact on their social development.
Summary
Although psychologists cite guilt and shame as important in development, these
emotions have received little research attention until recently. This may be partly due to
the difficulty in operationalizing and separating these emotions. Recent research, though,
has found that shame and guilt are indeed separate constructs, however they can be
elicited from the same situations. Although shame experiences rely on an attribution of

the self as defective, guilt requires a focus on the behavior (or nonbehavior). Theorists
have argued for various developmental courses for these emotions, yet little systematic
study of their emergence has been conducted. Sroufe (1995) argued that shame, a more
global reaction, acts as a precursor to the emergence of the capacity for guilt in preschool
children. H o f h a n (1983) added that shame relies on a belief that the misdeed was
uncontrollable, so that the focus of the self-rebuke is directed at the self, not the action.
The capacity for guilt emerges from the belief that the action was controllable (e.g., a lack
of effort at task failure), and is therefore reparable. Thus, the capacity to experience guilt
develops from empathy, in which children begin to understand that they can be the cause
of another person's distress.
The prerequisite to moving from a state of global shame to that of guilt then
requires that the child be able to see another's perspective, and be able to understand why
an event occurred, rather than focusing solely on the outcome of one's actions. The
developmental course of shame and guilt has received little research attention, though,
with various researchers arguing for different ages at which these emotions emerge. Most
researchers agree that the ability to focus on individual responsibility, rather than the
outcome of the event, is not present in children under 8 years old (e.g., Graham et al.,
1984; Saarni et al., 1998; Stipek & DeCotis, 1988). However, research investigating the
emergence of guilt has primarily used interviews or hypothetical situations to assess these
age changes, and therefore is arguably only assessing the child's understanding of the
differences between shame and guilt, rather than a behavioral tendency to differentiate
these emotions.

The alternative, studying guilt and shame in behavioral tests, is plagued with
difficulties. There are few situations that are capable of eliciting guilt in most children;
they may elicit shame instead (e.g., Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Tangney, 1995).
Observational studies of the emergence of guilt have shown that toddlers are capable of
guilt-like reactions to mishaps (e.g., Cole et al., 1992). In these studies by Cole and
colleagues, responses to the broken toy by toddlers supports the idea that, not only are
precursors to shame and guilt apparent at this age, but also that children will respond with
different emotions to the same situation. Results indicate that some toddlers responded
with shame-like responses and others with guilt-like responses. The continued
differentiation of these emotions remains unclear. In addition, studies across the toddler
period as well as middle childhood demonstrate that children experience more guilt with
age, and that guilt is associated with positive adjustment, whereas shame is associated
with internalizing behaviors. The emergence of guilt in the preschool period is relatively
unstudied, making the developmental course of this emotion, as well as its relation to
social and emotional adjustment, unclear. Anecdotal evidence suggests that preschoolers
are able to distinguish between events that they have caused versus those where they do
not have direct responsibility.
Finally, gender differences have been reported in several studies. For example, 2year-old boys were more often classified as exhibiting guilt-like reactions than were girls
(Barrett et al., 1993), and 3-year-old girls displayed more shame than did boys (Lewis et
al., 1992). Studies of older children have found that girls report more guilt than boys, and
that their feelings are more intense (e.g., Evans, 1984; Kugler & Jones, 1992; Tangney,
1990). Bybee (1998) notes that gender differences in the intensity and frequency of guilt

are not stable until adolescence, when females consistently report more guilt and more
intense experiences of guilt. It is unclear whether boys exhibit more guilt than girls
before adolescence, when these gender differences reverse, or whether these patterns are
simply unstable in younger children. As such, it may be difficult to interpret gender
differences that emerge in younger children.
The Present Study
In the present study, I propose that the capacity for expressing guilt as a separate
emotion emerges during the preschool period, with older preschoolers showing more guilt
in situations in which their personal responsibility is clearer. Using a modified version of
Cole and colleagues' (1992) mishap paradigm, preschoolers were presented with one of
two conditions that varied in the degree of personal responsibility. The mishap paradigm
was modified to adjust for the preschoolers' abilities and therefore parents were not
present during testing.
Basic Design
The study was a 3 (age: 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children) X 2 (responsibility:
ambiguous versus personal responsibility) factorial design. Age and responsibility were
between-subjects factors. First, the ambiguous responsibility condition consisted of the
experimenter placing a broken toy (named as a toy belonging to the experimenter) in the
room so that the child could play with it. To lower the degree of personal responsibility,
the child was told that the toy might have already been broken. Second, in the personal
responsibility condition, the child was given no information that the toy was broken.
Parent and teacher measures regarding social and emotional adjustment were also
collected.

Dependent Variables
When children in either condition played with the toy and the toy "broke," coders
rated the children's reactions on a series of behavioral (e.g., latency to repair the toy) and
emotional (e.g., global ratings of affect) categories. Composite scores were also
calculated on behavioral measures and affective expressions.
Individual Differences
In addition, to assess individual differences in shame and guilt behaviors, the
following measures were collected: parental reports of children's shame and guilt and
teacher ratings of children's social and emotional adjustment.
Developmental Hypotheses
Based on the above theory and literature, the following developmental hypotheses
were derived:
1. According to Sroufe's (1995) theory of shame and guilt, s h a l e is a more
global and less developmentally advanced emotion, and therefore is hypothesized to be
more apparent in young children. Younger preschool children were therefore expected to
show a) more avoidance behaviors (i.e., longer latencies to repair the toy and to comment
that the toy is broken; more frequent gaze aversion, more avoiding of the toy and of the
experimenter), b) more affective discomfort (i.e., more tensionlwony and anger, but
lower sadness), and c) higher composite scores of avoidance (i.e., total number of times
turned away from the toy, total number of gaze aversions, and total number of times the
child moves to another part of the room). This pattern of results predicted a main effect
for age such that younger preschool children were hypothesized to show more shame-

related behaviors and affect than older preschool children regardless of the responsibility
condition.
2. Since guilt is defined as a resulting from a feeling of personal responsibility
(e.g., Tangney, 1995; Weiner & Graham, 1989), it was hypothesized that children would
display more guilt than shame in the personal responsibility condition than in the
ambiguous responsibility condition. This main effect for responsibility condition was
expected to be apparent regardless of children's ages.
3. With respect to developmental trends within conditions, the following

interactions were hypothesized: a) 4-year-olds would display more guilt in the personal
responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, b) 4-year-olds
would display more guilt in the personal responsibility condition than would 2- or 3-yearold children, c) 3-year-olds would display more guilt in the personal responsibility
condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, d) 2-year-olds would not differ
in the amount of guilt and shame displayed in personal and ambiguous responsibility
conditions, and e) 2-year-old children would show more shame in the personal
responsibility condition than would 3- or 4-year-old children.
Individual Difference Hypotheses
Research and theory suggest that guilt may be a more adaptive coping mechanism
than shame, and therefore children who are prone to experience shame rather than guilt
may also differ on other dimensions, so that shame and guilt may act as an individual, in
addition to a developmental, difference. Shame-prone children were defined as those
who score below the median on amending and above the median on avoiding. Guiltprone children were defined as those who score above the median on amending and

below the median on avoiding. In order to assess the possible relationship between guilt
or shame-prone responding and children's coping patterns, it was hypothesized that:
4. With regard to gender, it was hypothesized that boys would be more likely to
be classified as guilt-prone than girls, and girls would be more likely to be classified as
shame-prone than boys.
5. Since shame has been found to be associated with higher levels of anger,
aggression, tension and worry, shame-prone children were hypothesized to exhibit more
internalizing and externalizing behaviors, and to be higher in anxiety, anger, and
aggression, and lower in prosocial behavior as assessed by the Social Competence and
Behavior Evaluation (SCBE; LaFreniere, Dumas, Capuano, & Dubeau, 1992) than guiltprone children. Across studies, guilt has been associated with lower aggression, more
constructive coping with anger, and increased empathy and prosocial behavior.
Therefore, guilt-prone children were expected to exhibit less anger and aggression, and to
exhibit more secure, prosocial, cooperative, and autonomous behaviors. Finally guiltprone children were expected to score higher on summary scores of social competence
and lower on internalizing or externalizing behaviors than shame-prone children.

6. With respect to the My Child, (Kochanska, DeVet, Goldrnan, Murray, &
Putnam, 1994), it was hypothesized that guilt-prone children would score higher on the
factor Active Moral RegulationNigilance, and on the following scales: Confession,
ReparationsIAmends, Concern/Correct others, Internalized conduct. Shame-prone
children were expected to score higher on the factor Affective Discomfort, and on the
following scales: GuiltIRemorse, Concern over good feeling with parent, Apology,
Empathic Prosocial.

CHAPTER 2:
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-one children in three age groups (20 two-year-olds, 21 three-year-olds, and
20 four-year-olds, M = 42 months; SD = 10.2; min = 24, max = 58) were matched for
gender (See Table 1). Participants were recruited fiom university laboratory nursery
classrooms and area preschool centers, with a participation rate of approximately 50
percent. Participants were from predominantly white (n=54), middle- and working-class
families living in small Maine and Maryland communities.
Informed Consent
Parents were contacted before the testing sessions and asked to participate in a
study that would examine the development of children's emotional responses. Parents
were told that their children would be videotaped to ensure that brief expressive reactions
could later be coded, and that videotapes would remain confidential. Parents were asked
to sign an informed consent form that described the nature of the study (See Appendix
A). In addition, each child was informed at the beginning of the experimental session that
he or she could withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason.
Apparatus
A video recorder with a zoom lens was placed unobtrusively either in the testing
room or in an adjoining room to videotape each participant's behavior during the
experimental session.

Table 1
Number of Participants by Age and Gender

Age

I

Girls

Boys

Questionnaire Measures
A questionnaire assessing the emotional characteristics of their child (i.e., My
Child; Kochanska et al., 1994) was given to each parent at the child's preschool or
daycare. Parents were instructed to return the forms to the teacher or preschool director.
After two weeks, parents were given written reminders to return the questionnaires to the
day care center. In addition, teachers completed one questionnaire (i.e., SCBE; LaFreniere
et al., 1992) designed to assess preschool children's social competence, which took
approximately 10 minutes to complete for each child.
My Child
To assess children's guilt and related behaviors, parents were asked to complete
the My Child scale (Kochanska et al., 1994). My Child is a 100-item questionnaire that
measures the development of conscience along two dimensions: affective discomfort and
active moral regulation or self-restraint. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert type scale
with the additional option of "not applicable." Ten individual scales within My Child
include: 1) guilt, remorselother emotional reactions after transgression, mishap,
wrongdoing; 2) concern over good feelings with parent after wrongdoing; 3) confession;
4) apology andor promise not to do it anymore; 5) reparationslamends; 6)
concendcorrections occasioned by others' transgressions; 7) internalized conduct; 8)
empathic, prosocial responses to another's distress; 9) symbolic reproduction owdealing
with wrongdoing; and 10) sensitivity to flawed or damaged objectslthemes of
wrongdoing. Test-retest reliability of individual scales as assessed by the Pearson
Product Moment Correlation ranges from .10 (symbolic reproduction) to .79 (confession),
with most scales averaging about .65. Further, My Child has been demonstrated to have

significant correspondence to behavioral measures of self control. Finally, My Child was
found to have alpha reliabilities ranging from .35 (sensitivity to flawed objects) to .90
(internalized conduct), with most scales averaging about .75. Due to the low reliability
and validity of several scales, the author created a second version of the measure. Alpha
reliabilities calculated on the second version ranged from .59 (sensitivity to flawed or
damaged objects, themes of wrongdoing) to .93 (symbolic reproduction ofldealing with
wrongdoing), with most scales averaging about .86. Test-retest reliability was not
conducted on the second version (Kochanska et al., 1994) (See Appendix B).
Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation Inventory
Teacher ratings of affective expression, social competence, and adjustment
difficulties were assessed using the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation
Inventory (SCBE; LaFreniere et al., 1992). The SCBE is an 80-item questionnaire
presented in a 6-point Likert type format completed by teachers and describes typical
preschooler behavior. Children were assessed according to the eight basic scales of the
SCBE: depressive-joyful, anxious-secure, angry-tolerant, isolated-integrated, aggressivecalm, egotistical-prosocial, oppositional-cooperative, and dependent-autonomous.
Interrater reliability for the scales calculated using Spearman-Brown estimates are
unifom~lyhigh, ranging from .72 to 3 9 . Internal consistency of the scales as assessed
with Cronbach's alpha is also uniformly high, ranging from .79 to .91. Children's overall
adjustment was also assessed using the three summary scores of the SCBE: social
competence, internalizing, and externalizing behavior problems (See Appendix C).

Behavioral Paradigm
Each child was tested in a modified version of Cole and colleagues (1992) mishap
paradigm, and participants were randomly assigned to one of two situations that varied in
their degree of responsibility. Participants in each age group and each condition were
matched for gender. In both conditions, the experimenter introduced the toy to the child
by demonstrating how the toy could be played with (such as moving the arms).
Experimental sessions (M = 121 seconds with the broken doll) were videotaped for later
coding.
.Ambiguous Responsibility
Children were told that the toy might be already broken to reduce the likelihood
that the child would feel that he or she was personally responsible for the toy breaking
(See Appendix D).
Personal Responsibilitv
In the personal responsibility condition, children were also told that the toy
belongs to the experimenter, but the experimenter did not mention that the toy might be
already broken. The lack of information that the toy was broken was intended to induce
feelings of personal responsibility when the child "broke" the toy.
Procedure
Each child was individually tested in one experimental session that lasted
approximately 10 minutes. In order to increase the likelihood that children's emotional
reactions were due to the experimental session rather than being in an unfamiliar setting,
no child was tested until the experimenter had built rapport with that child. All testing
was completed in the child's preschool either in their regular classroom or in a nearby

room, and an adult that was known to the child conducted each session. Experimental
sessions began with several minutes of play, initiated when the experimenter brought
several toys out of a toy box. At the end of the warm up period, the experimenter placed
the toys back in the toy box and introduced the experimentally manipulated toy.
The experimenter placed a Fisher-Price Sesame Street Clap-Hands Elmo doll
(named as a toy belonging to the experimenter) on a table in front of the child. After the
child played with the toy for several minutes, the experimenter explained that she had to
leave the room for a moment, but would be right back. The experimenter then put the toy
back in the toy box. The experimenter then told the child that he or she could play with
the toy while she was in the other room, at which time the experimenter placed a
seemingly identical experimental toy in front of the child. The toy was experimentally
manipulated so that the arm of the doll fell off when the child pulled its arms together to
make its hands clap. During the warm up period, children were shown how to make the
toy clap its hands, so that during the experimental session, they would clap its hands and
cause the toy to break a few seconds after they began playing with it. Children were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions prior to the experimental session (personal
responsibility and ambiguous responsibility). Experimental sessions were divided into
two segments: alone and when the experimenter returned.
Alone

In both conditions, children were left alone in the testing room for the initial play
period when the child "broke" the toy, although they were being unobtrusively observed.
The length of time that the child was left alone in the room varied depending on how long
the child could engage in self-directed behavior, and was ended if the child left the room,

appeared distressed, or never broke the toy. No child was left alone for longer than
approximately 2 minutes (min =9, max = 147, and M = 68 sec).
Experimenter Returns
After the child's initial reaction to the mishap occurred, the experimenter returned
to the room and appeared to be working with some papers. In order to allow children a
chance to confess without prompting, the experimenter initially made no comments to the
child but did notice that the toy was broken. The experimenter then asked the neutral
question "what happened," followed by a reminder that the toy is the experimenter's
favorite and the statement "that's too bad."
After the child's response to the experimenter pronlpts (M = 55 sec) and the end
of the experimental session, the child was informed that the experimenter had
inadvertently given him or her a toy that was already broken before the child began
playing with it, and got the unbroken toy out of the toy box. To further reduce any
negative feelings the child may have had, the experimenter "fixed" the experimentally
manipulated toy and let the child play with the original toy again. Children were then
given a chance to play with other toys, given a sticker or small prize for their
participation, and then were escorted back to their classroom. Children were not given
explicit instructions not to tell their classmates about the testing, as it was unlikely that
they would discuss the broken toy. One child did not pick up the toy to play with it, and
became emotionally upset when left alone. This child's data were not included in any
analyses.

Coding of the Videotapes
Two trained observers who were blind to the study's hypotheses completed all
coding. Coders, who were unfamiliar with the children in this study, consisted of
developmental-clinical graduate students from an emotional development laboratory.
Coders were trained to a criterion of 80% agreement before actual coding scores were
collected. Observer agreement was retested at random points to maintain inter-rater
agreement of at least 80% for all behavioral categories. Disagreements among coders
were examined for any systematic patterns (e.g., rating tensiodworry as sadness), and the
coders were retrained to the original criteria. See Appendix E for a complete description
of the coding system used. The following categories were used to classify children's
responses:
Affective Codes
Affective expressions were coded along five affective dimensions: positive affect,
anger, distress, tensiodworry, and blends. All affective categories included postural,
facial, and vocal indices of affect. Positive affect (joy) was coded when a child smiled
broadly, laughed, or giggled. Anger was coded when a child expressed frustration
through harsh vocalizations, clenched teeth, tightly pressed lips, or stamping feet. Sadness
was defined as sorrowful expressions or crying. Tensiodworry was used to describe
emotional blends not characteristic of a discrete emotion, but indicative of anxiety or
tension, such as fidgety movements, tensing of facial muscles, and strained vocalizations.
Blends were coded when two or more of the above emotions, or other basic emotions
such as fear or disgust, were present in the same expression. Coders indicated which
emotions were present in the blended expression. Neutral affective expressions consisted

of a lack of vocal, postural, or facial expressions, but a calm demeanor, and were not
coded (See Table 2). Other basic emotions such as fear and disgust were coded, but were
expected to occur in low frequency. Baseline affective expressions were coded for the
last one-minute of the warm up period when the experimenter presented the toy to the
child. These baseline affective expressions were contrasted with 1) affective expressions
when alone, and 2) affective expressions when the experimenter reentered and prompted
the child.
Affective codes were calculated as the total number of seconds that each category
was present divided by the total number of seconds that the child was present, resulting in
a rate of expression calculated for each affective category. Baseline rates for each
affective code were subtracted from affective rates alone and affective rates when the
experimenter returned. Affective coding began when the child discovered that the toy
was broken. In addition, coders rated the intensity of the affective expression for each
category. Coders rated each affect along a 2-point scale (1 = mild, 2 = full). Finally,
coders rated each child's global affective reaction at the conclusion of the experimental
session as either regulated or dysregulated.
Reparations and Avoidance
Coding of reparations and avoidance consisted of two separate segments: alone and
with the experimenter present. The following behaviors were used when the child was
alone, with timed variables beginning when the child first noticed that the toy was
broken: latency to repair, latency to comment on the broken toy, latency to gaze at the

Table 2
Facial. Vocal, and Postural Indicators of Affective Categories

Affective
Category

Facial

Vocal

Postural

Positive
Affect

smiling, wrinkling
around eyes

giggling, increased
pitch, laughing

relaxed muscles,
loose posture

Anger

narrowed eyes, lips
pressed and narrow

harsh, loud

tightened muscles,
clenched fists

Sadness

eyes lowered, lips
turned down

softened tone and
volume, crying

sunken posture,
head down

Tension1
worry

alert, nervous twitches,
tense facial muscles

strained, nervous,
jumpy

fidgety, tense posture

Neutral

calm, no major activity

calm, relaxed,
not excited

calm, attentive

-

-

-

Adapted from Cole et al. (1992).

experimenter, avoiding toy, and avoiding experimenter (See Table 3). Baseline behavioral
reactions (self-comfort, experimenter avoidance, and gaze aversion) were coded for the
last minute of the initial period when the experimenter demonstrated how to play with the
toy.
Reactions to the broken toy were coded according to behavioral and linguistic
indices, with reparations defined as attempts to repair the toy, seeking help, or
commenting on the broken toy and its need for repair. Avoidance was defined as gaze
aversion, turning away from the toy, or moving to another part of the room. Coders
recorded a total frequency score for both reparations and avoidance so that children could
have as few as zero occurrences of each behavioral category. In order to assess individual
differences in shame-prone and guilt-prone responding, measures of avoidance and
reparations were dichotomized into guilt-prone or shame-prone responding.

Table 3
Behavioral Measures of Reparation and Avoidance

Behavioral Measure

Definition

Reparations
Latency to repair
Latency to comment

Number of seconds before attempting to repair the toy
Number of seconds before verbalizing that the toy is broken

Avoidance
Gaze aversion

Toy avoidance
Experimenter avoidance

Number of seconds from when experimenter returns before
looking at the experimenter, excluding when the door first
opens
Number of seconds with body turned away from the toy
Number of seconds with body turned away from
experimenter after the experimenter re-enters the room

Adapted from Bmett et al. (1993).

CHAPTER m

RESULTS
Analysis Strategy
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was en~ployedto assess
differences in emotion and behavior between 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children (i.e., Age),
and between children in the personal and ambiguous responsibility conditions (i.e.,
Condition). Separate MANOVAs were used for the emotion variables and behavior
variables since the MANOVA is designed not only to protect against Type I error rates,
but also to analyze variables that are conceptualized as inter-related (Stevens, 1996).
Significant effects in the MANOVA were further explored using Tukey's HSD. Tukey's
acts as a protection factor for inflated Type I error rates when examining all pairwise
combinations (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000). Chi-square analyses were also conducted on
several nominal behavioral variables (e.g., confession) due to their nonparametric nature
(Myers & Well, 1995). Finally, children were classified into mutually exclusive groups
based on measures of avoidance so that emotional and behavioral differences between
these groups could be examined.
In regards to individual differences, the effectiveness of the guilt and shame-prone

dichotomy was first examined through a Discriminant Function Analysis @FA). One of
the major purposes of the DFA is to examine linear combinations of variables that are
used to classify subjects into groups. In the present study, the DFA was employed to
examine the importance of emotion and behavior variables in discriminating between
guilt and shame-prone responding. As such, the DFA was employed primarily to aid in
the interpretation of group differences rather than to classify unknown cases (Klecka,

1982). If the dichotomization of subjects into these groups based on a small subset of
variables (e.g., gaze aversion) is acceptable, then the DFA should accurately predict the
same group membership from a larger pool of variables (i.e., emotion and behavior
variables).
Analyses of the guilt and shame-prone dichotomy were further examined through
three separate analyses. First, independent samples t-tests were conducted on the
relationship between guilt and shame-prone responding with affective and behavioral
variables that were hypothesized to be related to these groups. Second, to determine the
relationship between guilt and shame and overall social and emotional functioning,
independent samples t-tests were conducted on the individual scales and summary scores
of the SCBE. In particular, the relationship between positive adaptation to the preschool
with guilt-prone responding, and negative adaptation with shame-prone responding was
investigated. Finally, the relationship between guilt- and shame-prone responding and
maternal reports of conscience was explored through analyses of the relationship between
these groups and the individual scales and overall factors of the My Child. Scores on the
My Child were analyzed for concurrent validity of the guilt and shame-prone dichotomy.
For instance, the relationship between guilt and maternal reports of amending behaviors
such as confession and apology was explored through independent samples t-tests.
Before addressing individual hypotheses, the reliability of the My Child and
SCBE, as well as inter-rater agreement for all emotion and behavior variables will be
addressed. In addition, preliminary analyses suggested that emotion variables violated
assumptions of normality necessary for parametric statistics to be performed, so data

transformations were employed. The nature and extent of these transformations will be
described before the results of the hypothesis testing are described.
Internal Consistency Reliability of the Questionnaire Measures
Preliminary analyses of the questionnaire measures were performed before
individual hypotheses were tested. Scale internal consistency reliabilities were computed
on the My Child and SCBE (Cronbach, 1951). The 100-item My Child scale assessed the
development of conscience in toddlers and preschool children, as rated by parents. The
overall My Child scale, and the two factors of affective discomfort and active moral
regulation or restraint produced coefficient alphas of .94, .8 1, and .91 respectively.
Cronbach's alpha calculated on individual scales ranged from .69 to .98 (see Table 4).
The 80-item SCBE assessed teacher rated social and emotional adjustment to the
preschool. Scale reliabilities computed on the three summary scores of social
competence, internalizing, and externalizing behavior problems produced coefficient
alphas of .95, 86, and .94 respectively. Internal consistency reliabilities conlputed on the 8
scales ranged from .77 to .90 (see Table 5).
Data Transformations
Given the large positive skew for affective categories (e.g., joy, anger, sadness,
tension/worry, and blends) all variables were normalized and ranked using Tukey's
procedure. Affective expressions were heavily skewed, and therefore had large standard
deviations since these variables have no upper limit and a fixed lower limit (See Table 6).
Myers and Well (1995) note that analysis of skewed data seriously affects power;

Table 4
Internal Consistency Reliabilities of My Child Scales

Scale (Number of Items)

Alpha

Guilt, remorselother emotional
reactions after transgression (1 8). ......................... 84
Concern over good feelings
with parent after wrongdoing (8). ......................... 75
Confession (7). ...................................................78
Apology andlor promise not to
do it anymore (6). .................................... 86
Reparationslamends (9). ........................................ 70
Concern~correctionsoccasioned
by others7transgressions (7). .............................. 84
Internalized conduct (20). ...................................... 86
Empathic, prosocial responses
to another's distress (13). ................................... 80
Symbolic reproduction oudealing
with wrongdoing (5). ....................................... 98
Sensitivity to flawed or damaged
objectslthemes of wrongdoing (7). ....................... 69

Table 5
Internal Consistency Reliabilities of Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation
Inventory Scales

Scale (Number of Items)

Alpha

Depressive.joyf51(10) ........................... 77
Anxious-secure (10) ............................. 82
Angry-tolerant (10) .............................. 90
Isolated-integrated (10).......................... 85
Aggressive-calm (10) ............................83
Egotistical-prosocial (10) ........................81
Oppositional-cooperative (10) .................. 83
Dependent-autonomous (10) ................... 77

60

Table 6
Means and Standard Deviati s by Age for Affective Categories a Alone and with
Experimenter Present

Affective Category

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Alone
Mild Joy
-21.67
Full Joy
-0.26
Mild Anger
0.25
Full Anger
0.00
Mild Sadness
4.35
Full Sadness
1.20
Mild TensionNony
16.99
Full TensionNony
3.94
Sadness and
TensionNony Blend 2.25
Experimenter Present
-20.75
Mild Joy
Full JOY
-0.65
Mild Anger
0.31
Full Anger
0.00
Mild Sadness
9.73
Full Sadness
2.13
Mild TensionNony
20.17
Full TensionNony
0.54
Sadness and
TensionNony Blend 0.86
a

12.54
1.87
1.28
0.00
9.79
6.37
12.06
2.12
3.83

-24.95 12.43
-0.55
0.92
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
10.42 11.04
1.43 6.55
15.65 12.89
-0.19
0.87
6.94

8.35

Affective categories are reported as rates per minute corrected fkom baseline.

therefore ranks should be utilized for all analyses of this type of data. Behavioral
categories did not exhibit the same degree of skew, and therefore these data were not
transformed.
Hypothesis 1: Age Differences
According to Sroufe's (1995) theory of emotional development, shame is a more
global and less developmentally advanced emotion than guilt, and therefore was
hypothesized to appear earlier in development. Therefore, younger preschool children
were expected to show a) more avoidance behaviors (i.e., longer latencies to repair the
toy and to comment that the toy is broken; more frequent gaze aversion, more avoiding of
the toy and of the experimenter), b) more affective discomfort related to shame (i.e., more
tensiodwony and anger, but lower sadness), and c) higher composite scores of avoidance
(i.e., total number of times turned away from the toy, total number of gaze aversions, and
total number of times the child changes positions in the room). This pattern of emotional
and behavioral reactions reflects a main effect for age such that younger preschool
children were expected to show more shanle-related behaviors and affect than would
older preschool children regardless of the responsibility condition.
To test this, a 2 (responsibility) X 3 (age) multiple analysis of variance was
conducted. Affective categories (positive affect, anger, sadness, tensiodwony, and
blends) served as the dependent variables. A second 2 (responsibility) X 3 (age)
MANOVA was conducted with behaviors (e.g., latency to repair, latency to comment,
gaze aversion) serving as the dependent variables. Results are presented in terms of

emotions and behaviors when the child was initially alone, and then when the
experimenter returned to the room, so that reactions to an audience can be distinguished
from those without an audience.
Alone
Previous research has indicated that tensiodworry is related to shame-like
reactions, and therefore it was hypothesized that it would decrease with age. As
expected, results indicated that expressions of full tensiodwony varied as a function of
age, F (2,55) = 3.46, p < .05, eta2 = .112. Post Hoc tests revealed that 2-year-olds
expressed more full tensiodworry than did 3-year-olds (M = +0.26 and -0.15,
respectively), LSD = .410, p < .05. There was no significant difference between 2- and 4year-olds or 3- and 4-year-olds in expressions of full tensiodworry (See Figure 1). These
age effects indicate that 2-year-olds expressed significantly more full expressions of
tensiodworry. No other affective variables, including all guilt-relevant variables such as
sadness, were significantly different as a b c t i o n of age.
Analyses of behavioral measures revealed that latency to repair varied as a
function of age, F (2, 55) = 4.69, p < .05, eta2 = .146. Post Hoc tests revealed that 2-yearolds had longer latencies to repair than 4-year-olds (M = 15.25 and 2.85 sec,
respectively), HSD = 12.40, p < .05. There was a trend for 2-year-olds to have longer
latencies to repair than 3-year-olds (M = 15.25 and 2.85 sec, respectively), HSD = 11.do,
p < .06, but 3-year-olds did not differ from 4-year-olds, HSD = 0.96, n.s. (See Figure 3).
No other behavioral measures of avoiding or amending were significantly different based
on the subject's age.

Figure 1
Expressions of Full TensionIWorry when Alone as a Function of Age

Figure 2
Exvressions of Sadness and TensionlWory Blends when the Experimenter Returned
as a Function of Age

Figure 3
Latency to Repair as a Function of Age

16

Experimenter Returned
Analyses of affective expressions when the experimenter returned to the room
showed few overall age effects. However, blends of sadness and tensiodwony did differ
significantly with age, F (2, 55) = 7.08, p < .01, eta2 = .205. Post Hoc tests revealed that
2-year-olds expressed less sadness and tensiodwony than did 3- year-olds, LSD = - 3 5 1,
p < .001, and 4-year-olds, LSD = -.45 1, p < .05. There was a trend for 3-year-olds to
express more sadness and tensiodwony blends than 4-year-olds, LSD = .399, p < .08
(See Figure 2). This finding may not be in contrast to the decrease in tensiodwony with
age that was seen when the child was alone given that tensiodwony was blended with
sadness, a guilt-relevant emotional expression. When comparing Figures 1 and 2, the data
suggest that although all children displayed tensiodwony, only 2-year-olds did not blend
this emotion with sadness.
Analyses of behavioral data revealed a main effect of age for several variables
related to overall patterns of avoidance, particularly toy avoidance and avoiding the
experimenter. First, toy avoidance varied as a function of age, F (2, 55) = 3.27, p < .05,
eta2 = .106. A Least Squares Difference (LSD) test was performed in order to further
explore this overall age difference. As seen in Figure 4, results revealed that 2-year-olds
showed more toy avoidance than 3-year-olds (Ms = 7.65 and 0.67 sec respectively), LSD
= 6.98, p

<.05, and 4-year-olds (M = 0.55 sec), LSD = 7.10, p <.05. In addition, avoiding

the experimenter varied as a function of age, F (2,55) = 4.03, p < .05, eta2 = .128. Post
hoc tests revealed that 2-year-olds displayed more avoidance of the experimenter than did
4-year-olds (Ms = 3.92 and 0.13 respectively), HSD = 3.79, p < .05. There was a trend for

Figure 4
Toy Avoidance as a Function of Age

Figure 5
Experimenter Avoidance as a Function of Age

2-year-olds to display more avoidance of the experimenter than 3-year-olds (M = 0.13),
HSD = 3.36, p < .06, but 3-year-olds did not differ from 4-year-olds, HSD = 0.43, n.s.
(See Figure 5).
Chi-square analyses were conducted on nominal behavioral categories
(commenting before or after prompting, denyinglminimizing, confessing, emotion
regulation, and shame-guiltfprone). There were no age differences in emotion regulation
(i.e., regulated or dysregulated), x2 (2) = 2.17, n.s., commenting either before or after
being prompting, x2 (2) = 3.26, n.s., denyinglminimizingbefore prompting, x2 (2) = 2.50,
n.s., denyinglminimizing after prompting, x2 (2) = 0.1 1, n.s., or confessing before
prompting, x2 (2) = 1.83, n.s. Only 5 children confessed before being prompted, whereas
21 confessed after being prompted. There was a weak trend for confessing after being
prompted to vary with age, with 4-year-olds being more likely to confess than 2- or 3year-olds x2 (2) = 4.99, p < .09, but few children confessed. It should be noted that
children could confess both before and after being prompted. One 2-year-old, one 3-yearold, and three 4-year-olds confessed both before and after being prompted by the
experimenter (See Table 7).
The classification of guilt- and shame-prone responding was originally planned to
include measures of avoidance and reparation as the criteria. For example, children
scoring above the median in reparation and below the median in avoidance would be
classified as guilt-prone. However, using this classification system, only 7 children were
classified as guilt-prone, so a less stringent criterion was established. Given that only 33%
of children confessed, but experimenter avoidance or gaze aversion were common among

Table 7
Number of Children Who Confessed Before and After Prompting as a Function of Aae
Age

Before Prompt

After Prompta

No confessionb

It should be noted that children could confess both before and after being prompted.
One 2-year-old, one 3-year-old, and three 4-year-olds confessed both before and after
being prompted by the experimenter.

children, only avoidance but not reparation was used to create these groupings. As noted
earlier, the distribution of gaze aversion and experimenter avoidance were both positively
skewed (skew = 1.92, SE = .306, and skew = 3.31, SE = .306, respectively),
therefore groups were dichotomized based on the median rather than the mean score
(Myers & Well, 1995).
Since reparation was not included as a means of dichotomizing groups, labeling
these grouping as shame- and guilt-prone may be unwarranted at this time. Participants
scoring above the median in gaze aversion or experimenter avoidance were classified as
avoidant (Mdns = 0.67 and 1.52 per min., respectively). Participants scoring below the
median in gaze aversion or experimenter avoidance were classified using the more neutral
term nonavoidant. Of the 61 participants, 26 were classified as nonavoidant and 35 were
classified as avoidant. Avoidant responding varied as a function of age, x2 (2) = 9.41, p <
.01, with 2-year-olds more likely to be classified as avoidant and 4-year-olds more likely
to be classified as nonavoidant (See Table 8). Follow-up analyses using Pearson's
Contingency Coefficient were conducted to determine the strength of the relationship
between age and classification. Pearson's Contingency Coefficient is a nonparametric
statistic similar to the Spearn~anthat describes the strength of the relationship between
nominal variables (Runyon, Haber, Pittenger, & Coleman, 1996). Analyses revealed that
there was a moderate degree of association between age and classification (cc = .37, p
<.01).

Table 8
Number of Children Classified as Avoidant and Nonavoidant as a Function of Age
Age

Nonavoidant

4-year-olds

14

Total

26

Avoidant

Total

Hypothesis 2: Responsibility and Affective Expressions
Since guilt is being defined as resulting fiom a feeling of personal responsibility
(e.g., Tangney, 1995; Weiner & Graham, 1989), it was hypothesized that children would
display more guilt than shame in the personal responsibility condition than in the
ambiguous responsibility condition. This main effect for condition should be apparent
even when collapsing across age groups. Several affective expressions relevant to guilt
and shame did differ as a function of the responsibility condition, but these results were
contrary to the hypotheses stated above.
Alone
Expressions of joy have been noted as decreasing more substantially in instances
of guilt rather than shame. As expected, expressions of full joy had a larger decrease
fiom baseline in the personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous
responsibility condition (M = -0.26 and 0.14, respectively), F (1, 55) = 4.01, p = .05, eta2
= .068. All

other guilt and shame relevant emotion variables failed to reach significance.

Although only one affective variable varied as a function of condition, children
exhibited differences in several behaviors depending on whether they had or had not been
told that the toy might be broken. Results of the responsibility condition indicated a main
effect for latency to repair, F (1, 55) = 5.22, p < .05, eta2 = .094, with children showing
longer latencies to repair in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous
responsibility condition (Ms = 11.70 and 2.94 sec, respectively). There was an additional
condition main effect for self-comfort, F (1, 55) = 4.05, p < .05, eta2 = .069, with children
showing more self-comforting behaviors in the personal responsibility than in the
ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = 0.40 and -0.55, respectively). Finally, there

was a trend for asking to leavelleaving, with children in the personal responsibility
condition more often trying to leave the room than in the ambiguous responsibility
condition (Ms = 0.40 and 0.19, respectively), F (1, 55) = 3.14, p < .09, eta2 = .054.
Overall, these findings indicate that the responsibility manipulation was successful, but
may not have had the effects that were originally intended given the relationship found
between shame-relevant behaviors and the personal responsibility condition.
Experimenter Returns
Children expressed less mild fear in the personal responsibility than in the
ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.19 and 0.29 respectively), F (1, 55) = 7.95, p
< .O1, eta2 = .126. In addition, there was a trend for expressions of full joy to have a
larger decrease from baseline in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.23 and 0.09 respectively), F (1, 55) = 2.87, p < .lo, eta2
= .050. All

other emotion variables were non significant.

Analyses of behavioral measures revealed no significant differences in behaviors
as a function of condition. There was a trend for children to display more self-comfort in
the personal responsibility than the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 0.60 and 0.39, respectively), F (l,55) = 3.82, p < .06, eta2 = .065. Chi-square analyses of nominal
behavioral data revealed that children in the personal and ambiguous responsibility
conditions did not differ in whether they commented about the broken toy before or after
being prompted, x2 (1) = 2.08, n.s.; deniedminimized before being prompted, or after
being prompted x2 (1) = 0.14, and 0.02 respectively, n.s.; confessed before or after being
prompted x2 (1) = 0.18, and 0.13 respectively, n.s.; or in their overall emotion x2 (1) =
0.14, n.s. Avoidant and Nonavoidant responding did differ as a function of condition,

with chlldren more often being classified as avoidant than nonavoidant in the personal
responsibility condition, x2 (I) = 3.85, p = .05 (See Table 9). These findings were
contrary to expectations, but are consistent with the overall emotion and behavioral
findings when the child was alone.
Hypothesis 3: Age and Responsibility
With respect to developmental trends within conditions, the following interactions
were hypothesized: a) 3- and 4-year-old children would display more guilt in the personal
responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, b) 4-year-olds
would display more guilt in the personal responsibility condition than would 2- or 3-yearold children, c) 2-year-old children would not differ in the amount of guilt and shame
displayed in personal and ambiguous responsibility conditions, and d) 2-year-old children
would show more shame in the personal responsibility condition than would 3- or 4-yearold children.

An additional MANOVA was conducted with behavioral categories (e.g., latency to
repair toy) as the dependent variables to determine if age groups differed in the overall
use of avoidance or reparation behaviors. Planned comparisons were conducted to
determine if 1) older children use more reparation behaviors (repair and comment) in the
personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, and 2)
younger children use more avoidance behaviors (gaze aversion, toy avoidance, and
experimenter avoidance) in the personal responsibility condition than older preschoolers
use.

Table 9
Number of Children Classified as Avoidant and Nonavoidant as a Function of Condition
Condition

Nonavoidant

Personal
responsibility

9

Ambiguous
responsibility

17

Total

26

Avoidant

Total

Alone
An age by responsibility interaction was found such that blends of joy and

tensiodworry, F (2, 55) = 3.34, p < .05, eta2 = .108, varied as a function of group, with 4year-olds expressing fewer blends of joy and tensiodworry in the personal responsibility
than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.19 and 0.42 respectively), F (1,
59) = 6.94, p < .05, eta2 = .105. Although no other age by condition interactions were
significant in the overall MANOVA, M h e r analyses of predicted relationships were
examined.
Examination of emotion variables revealed no significant simple main effects,
although several emotions did approach significance. Among 2-year-olds, there was a
trend for children to have a larger decrease, from baseline, in expressions of full joy in the
personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.17 and
0.44 respectively), F (1, 59) = 2.98, p < .lo, eta2 = .048. Among 3-year-olds, there was a
trend for expressing less full anger in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.02 and 0.19 respectively), F (1, 59) = 2.90, p < .lo, eta2
= .047.

In addition, there was a trend for 3-year-olds to express fewer blends of fear and

sadness in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms
= -0.2 1 and

0.02 respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.1 1, p < .09, eta2 = .050.

Examination of behavioral variables revealed a condition by age interaction for
latency to repair, F (2, 55) = 3.46, p < .05, eta2 = .112. Follow up analyses indicated that
for 2-year-olds, latency to repair was longer in the personal responsibility than the
ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 26.4 and 4.1 sec, respectively), F (1, 59) =
11.15, p < .001, eta2 = .159, but did not differ for 3-year-olds, F (1,59) = 0.28, n.s., eta2 =

.005, or 4-year-olds, F (1, 59) = .005, n.s., eta2 = .000 (See Table 10). Exploratory
analyses conducted on children's affection towards the toy revealed a condition by age
interaction for affection, F (2, 55) = 4.23, p < .09, eta2 = .133. In particular, less affection
was shown by 3-year-olds in the personal responsibility than the ambiguous responsibility
condition, (Ms = 0.10 and 0.73, respectively), F (1, 59) = 6.48, p < .05, eta2 = .099, but
affection did not differ for 2- and 4-year-olds by responsibility condition.
Although the overall condition by age interaction for self-comfort was not
significant, for 2-year-olds, self comfort was more frequent in the personal responsibility
than the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 1.3 and -0.60, respectively), F (1, 59)
= 5.42, p

< .05, eta2 = .084). In addition, 4-year-olds exhibited a trend to attempt to leave

the room more often in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility
condition (Ms = 0.30 and 0.20, respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.97, p < .06, eta2 = .063).
Experimenter Returns
Analyses of age by condition conducted on emotion variables revealed no significant
interactions. Follow up analyses within age groups revealed that there was a trend for 2year-olds to express less mild fear in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.25 and 0.29 respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.22, p < .08, eta2
= .052.

Among 3-year-olds, less mild fear was expressed in the personal responsibility

than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = 0.02 and 0.56 respectively), F (1,
59) = 6.53, p < .05, eta2 = .10 (See Figure 6).

Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Latency to Repair in Seconds
Factor

Mean

SD

2-year-olds

26.40

32.83

3-year-olds

5.60

11.75

4-year-olds

3.10

2.89

2-year-olds

4.10

3.41

3-year-olds

2.18

1.60

4-year-olds

2.60

1.78

7.25

16.15

Personal Responsibility

Ambiguous Responsibility

Entire Sample

Figure 6
Expressions of Mild Fear when the Experimenter Returned as a Function of Age and
Condition

I-t-Ambiguous 1

Only blends of tensionlwony with joy were significant among 4-year-olds, with
fewer blends of tensionlwony and joy expressed in the personal responsibility condition
than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.23 and 0.38 respectively), F (1,
59) = 5.07, p < .05, eta2 = .079. Analyses of behavioral data revealed a trend for 2-yearolds to display more self-comfort, (Ms = 1.40 and -0.30, respectively), F (1,59) = 3.76, p
< .06, eta2 = .060, and more gaze aversion, (Ms = .67 and .02 sec, respectively), F (I, 59)
= 3.78, p

< .06, eta2 = .060, in the personal responsibility than the ambiguous

responsibility condition. In addition, 3-year-olds displayed less affection with the toy in
the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 0.00 and
0.55 respectively), F (1, 59) = 4.79, p < .05, eta2 = .075. There was no significant
difference between personal responsibility and ambiguous responsibility groups for 4year-olds on any behavioral variables.
Individual Differences
Preliminary Analyses of Dichotomy
In order to determine if the avoidant and nonavoidant dichotomy reflected the
variability found in affective and behavioral measures, the following preliminary analyses
were conducted on these two groups. A discriminant function analysis @FA) was
performed to detennine which variables significantly contribute to the discrimination of
avoidant and nonavoidant responding. One of the purposes of the DFA is to aid in the
interpretation of how groups differ, but the variables included must meet several
assumptions, such as being measured at the interval or ratio level and not being a linear
combination of other variables (Klecka, 1982). As such, several emotion and behavioral
variables (i.e., confession before or after prompt, denylminimize before or after prompt,

aggression to the toy, overall emotional expressions, and overall emotion regulation) were
excluded from the analysis, as well as subject characteristics such as gender.
The eigenvalue, 6.77, and canonical correlation, .93, suggest that the h c t i o n is
substantively meaningful in discriminating group membership. In addition, Wilks'
lambda indicated that the function does discriminate group membership, 12 = . 1 2 9 , 2 (43)
= 76.90, p

<.001. Table 11 shows the standardized canonical coefficients for variables

that made sizable contributions to the DFA. Several emotion variables made sizable
contributions to the DFA, particularly joy and tensiodwony. As expected, amending and
avoiding behaviors not used to create these grouping, such as affection and self-comfort,
also contributed to the discrimination of groups. The absolute values of these
standardized coefficients were greater than 0.95. In addition, toy avoidance was
moderately important to the discrimination of groups (w = -0.825). If shame is a
precursor to guilt, then age should be a significant discriminator, and was therefore
included in the DFA, but the standardized coefficient did not contribute to the
discrimination of the avoidant and nonavoidant groups (w = -0.220).
Hypothesis 4: Gender and GuiltfShame-Prone Responding
With regards to gender, it was hypothesized that boys would be more likely than
girls to be classified as guilt-prone, and that girls would be more likely to be classified as
shame-prone than boys. Given the inconsistency of gender findings in the literature, these
hypotheses were exploratory. Results revealed that boys and girls did not differ in
avoidant and nonavoidant classification, x2 (1) = .40, p = .53.

Table 11
Standardized Canonical Coefficients for Variables Discriminating Avoidant and
Nonavoidant Groupings

-

Variable

Standardized Coefficients

Alone
Mild Joy
Full Joy
Mild Sadness
Full Sadness
Full TensiodWorry
TensiodWorry
Sadness Blend
Experimenter Returns
Mild Joy
Full Joy
Mild TensiodWorry
TensiodWorry
Fear Blend
TensiodWorry
Joy Blend
Affection
Self Comfort

-1.636
-2.594
-1.548
1.950
1.O39
1.131

2.546
2.744
1.093
-1.270
1.104
0.984
0.907

Hypothesis 5 : Prediction of GuiltlShame-Prone Responding
Differences in affective expressions in avoidant and nonavoidant children were
examined through independent samples f-tests. Expressions of joy were the only emotion
variable to vary as a function of nonavoidant and avoidant classification. As predicted,
nonavoidant children showed a greater decrease in mild joy than did avoidant children
when alone (Ms = -0.42 and 0.3 1 respectively), f (59) = -3.08, p < .01, and when the
experimenter returned (Ms = -0.46 and 0.35 respectively), f (59) = -3.08, p < .01. In
addition, there was a trend for avoidant children to express more fear and tensiodworry
than nonavoidant children when the experimenter returned (Ms = 0.14 and -0.08
respectively), t (59) = -1.78, p < .08, although this failed to reach significance.
Behavioral differences in avoidant and nonavoidant responding were more
apparent than were affective differences. Nonavoidant children were consistently higher
in reparations and lower in avoidance behaviors than were avoidant children. As shown
in Figure 7, nonavoidant children had shorter latencies to repair (Ms = 2.6 sec and 10.7
respectively), f (59) = -2.01, p < .05 than did avoidant children. Nonavoidant children
less often asked to leave or tried to leave than did avoidant children (Ms = 4.62 and
22.29 respectively), f (59) = -2.33, p < .05 (See Figure 8). There was also a trend for
nonavoidant children to have shorter latencies to gaze at the experimenter (Ms = 1.5 and
3.7 sec respectively), f (59) = -1.89, p < .07, although this failed to reach significance.

Figure 7
Latency to Repair among Nonavoidant and Avoidant Children

Nonavoidant

Avoidant

Figure 8
Rate of Asking to Leave or Leaving among Nonavoidant and Avoidant Children when
the Experimenter Returned

Nonavoidant

Avoidant

Finally, an examination of differences in global social and emotional
characteristics as a function of avoidant and nonavoidant classification was assessed with
independent samples 1-tests. SCBE scales and summary scores and My Child scales
served as the dependent variables. It was hypothesized that guilt-prone children would be
higher in social competence, but lower in internalizing and externalizing behaviors than
shame-prone children.
As hypothesized, nonavoidant children were rated by teachers as higher in social
competence than were avoidant children (Ms = 131.7 and 114.9), f(59) = 2.26, p < .05.
Given that age and social competence are consistently related in previous studies, and in
the present study (1 = .28, p < .05), it is possible that the relationship between social
competence and avoidantlnonavoidant responding was an artifact of the covariance of
age. Therefore, group differences in social competence were examined with the effects of
age partialled out. The corrected model again reached significance, F (2,58) = 3.578, p <
.05, indicating that social competence does make a unique contribution to nonavoidant
and avoidant responding beyond its relationship with age. Hypotheses regarding
individual scales were partially supported, with nonavoidant chldren displaying more
positive social and emotional hnctioning than avoidant children. Nonavoidant children
were rated by teachers as more tolerant (Ms = 35.9 and 30.5, respectively), t(59) = 2.20,

p < .05, prosocial, (Ms = 35.4 and 30.1, respectively), t (59) = 2.86, p < .0l, cooperative
(Ms = 40.2 and 34.5 respectively), t (59) = 3.07, p < .01, and as exhibiting fewer
externalizing behaviors (Ms = 84.9 and 74.9 respectively), (59) = 2.50, p < .05. In
addition, there was a trend for nonavoidant children to be rated by teachers as more calm
than avoidant children (Ms = 35.8 and 32.0, respectively), f (59) = 1.86, p < .07.

With regard to My Child, it was hypothesized that 1) confession, apology,
reparation, empathy, internalized conduct, and concern over others' transgressions would
be higher in guilt-prone than shame-prone children, and 2) affective discomfort after
wrongdoing and concern over good feelings with parent, will be higher in shame-prone
than guilt-prone children. Nonavoidant children did not differ fiom avoidant children in
confession or internalized conduct, but were rated by parents as higher in apology andlor
promise not do it again (Ms = 28.3 and 24.5 respectively), t (59) = 2.04, p < .05,
reparatiodamends (Ms = 42.7 and 39.8 respectively), t (59) = 1.8, p < .08,
empathic/prosocial response to another's distress (Ms = 69.9 and 62.0 respectively), t (59)
= 3.52, p = .001, and

active moral regulatiodvigilance (Ms = 180.5 and 165.0

respectively), t (59) = 2.29, p < .05. Contrary to expectations, nonavoidant children were
higher than avoidant children in affective discomfort after wrongdoing (Ms = 210.6 and
194.2 respectively), t (59) = 2.30, p < .05, suggesting that this factor represents affective
discomfort as noticed by the parent rather than the child. In addition, although not
hypothesized, nonavoidant children were rated by their parents as higher than avoidant
children in corrections occasioned by others' transgressions (Ms = 34.6 and 30.7
respectively), t (59) = 2.32, p < .05.
No particular hypothesis was stated in regard to either of the following scales:
"symbolic reproduction of7dealing with wrongdoing" and "sensitivity to flawed or
damaged objects, themes of wrongdoing", nor did nonavoidant and avoidant children
differ on any these scales.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Recent research has begun to explore the affective expressions and behavioral
responses that are particular to mild guilt and shame in children in laboratory conditions
(e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole et al., 1992; Lewis, 1991; Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al.,
1992). In addition, it is important to determine if any other individual differences exist
between children prone to the expression of one emotion rather than the other. To date,
few studies have examined the development of the capacity to express guilt and shame in
young children, and it is currently not clear how these emotions are expressed in
preschool children. The present study examined expressions of guilt and shame in
response to a laboratory mishap paradigm to investigate age changes and the effects of
context (i.e., personal responsibility vs. ambiguous responsibility) on children's affective
and behavioral responses.

In light of the present study as well as others (e.g., Barrett, et al., 1993; Cole et al.,
1992) several questions remain with regard to what expressive components of guilt are
convincingly present at this age. Shame may be characterized by anxiety and tension
coupled with avoidant behaviors. However, the lack of avoidance may be necessary, but
not sufficient to infer the presence of guilt. Theorists generally agree that the presence of
guilt is marked not only by the absence of avoidance, but also by the presence of
reparations and confession, as well as affective discomfort (e.g., Ferguson & Stegge,
1998; Lewis, 1993; Sroufe, 1995; Tangney, 1998). To date, research investigating young
children's expressions in response to mishap paradigms has failed to define children as
guilt-prone based on both avoidance and reparation measures (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993).

However, preschool aged children and toddlers who are low in avoidance do display
affective and behavioral reactions that are consistent with guilt. Alternatively, if fullfledged guilt is not present in preschool children, then it may be more useful to determine
what affective expressions and behavioral tendencies are present in terms of
developmental precursors. These nascent abilities may reflect the emergence of the
capacity for guilt during the preschool years, but do not define guilt.
In general, results of the present revealed that younger preschoolers do express
more shame-relevant emotions (e.g., tensiodworry) and behaviors (e.g., experimenter
avoidance) than did older preschoolers. In contrast, older preschoolers expressed guiltrelevant emotions such as sadness, but blended with tensiodworry, and guilt-relevant
behaviors such as shorter latencies to attempt to repair the broken toy. However, an
examination of guilt- and shame-prone responding was not possible in the present study,
as children were dichotomized only by avoidance measures but not also with the more
inclusive definition of reparation and confession. Children low in avoidance also
displayed more reparation and scored higher on parental-reports of guilt-relevant
behaviors, suggesting that these children may be prone to expressing guilt. Moreover,
individual differences in overall socioemotional adjustment were associated with the
avoidanthonavoidant classification.
Developmental Differences
Affective Expressions
As hypothesized, tensiodworry did decrease with age, but the difference was
primarily between 2- and 3-year-olds. Interestingly, no other emotion variables were
significant. This was surprising given that guilt and shame are linked to emotional

expressions (Cole et al., 1992, Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al., 1992). However, the effect
size for tensionlworry was fairly strong, suggesting that insight into the expression of this
emotion may be key to understanding developmental differences in shame and guilt.
Additionally, tensionlworry blended with sadness increased with age, again with the
primary difference being between 2- and 3-year-olds. Taken together, these findings
suggest that 2-year-olds did not blend tensionlworry with sadness when the experimenter
was present, but older preschoolers did. These findings are consistent with theories of the
adaptive function of emotional expressions (e.g., Campos & Barrett, 1984; Izard, 1993),
which state that sadness has a social and expressive function that tensionlworry does not.
As Izard notes, sadness entails a "deeper reflection on a disappointing performance or a
failure" but also arouses empathy and assistance from others (1993, p. 634). In particular,
sadness in this context signals that a child needs assistance in repairing the toy and or the
relationship, which is consistent with the finding that thls emotion (although blended)
was more prevalent in older preschoolers, who were also less likely to be classified as
avoidant. It is likely that younger preschoolers who exhibited a general pattern of
avoidance were not as outwardly concerned with repair and therefore did not express
sadness. Given that tensionlworry decreased with age, and was related to avoidance, and
sadness blended with tensionlwony increased with age but was not related to avoidance,
these blended emotional expressions typical of older preschoolers likely reflect more
sadness than tensionlworry. However, the sadness expressed was not isolated from other
expressions. Given the novelty of the testing situation, and the possibility of punishment,
these added expressions might have reflected some degree of anxiety about the outcon~e
of the mishap. Additionally, these mixed expressions may be reflective of developmental

precursors to older children and adults' guilt expressions and experiences, and may signal
the preschool child's transition from shame-prone to guilt-prone responding.
Behavioral Reactions
Although it was hypothesized that younger children would show more frequent
avoidant behaviors, 2-, 3- and 4-year olds did not differ in self-comfort, toy avoidance,
affection or aggression towards the toy, or in attempts to leave the room when initially
left alone. These findings were surprising given that avoidance is consistently found to
relate to shame in failure tasks (e.g., Lewis et al., 1992) and mishap paradigms (Barrett et
al., 1993; Cole et al., 1992). However, younger children did differ in their initial reaction
to the broken toy, as 2-year-olds had longer latencies to attempt to repair the toy than did
4-year-olds. Latency to repair failed to differ significantly between 3-year-olds and either
2- or 4-year olds. This was probably due to the relatively small sample size, as the
developmental difference approached significance, and the effect size was quite large.
This is consistent with previous research that found latencies to repair, as well as
latencies to comment about the mishap, are shorter in amending children (Barrett et al.,
1993).
Several behavioral differences did emerge when the experimenter was present
though, suggesting that the reactions to the mishap were intensified by the presence of the
person who was affected. Again, behavioral differences existed primarily between 2year-olds and older preschoolers, with 2-year-olds showing more avoidance. In particular,
2-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to avoid the toy by turning their bodies
away from it or by pushing the toy away from them. These findings should be interpreted
with caution, as a more liberal post hoc test was performed to explore these differences,

and the effect size was relatively small. Finally, 2-year-olds avoided the experimenter by
turning their bodies away from the experimenter more frequently than 4-year-olds. Given
the moderate effect size for this variable, the lack of significance for other age contrasts
may also be partly due to sample size. It should be noted that children were often tested
in small rooms, and no other toys were present, making experimenter avoidance awkward
for the child, as there was no other activity or person that could be the focus of their
attention. This adds further support to the need to examine behavior alone and with the
experimenter present, as the experimenter acted as more than simply an audience
member. Although many theorists argue that an audience is not required for one to
experience self-conscious emotions (e.g., Sroufe, 1995; Stipek et al., 1992), these
emotions may be intensified when one is present, especially in the case of a wrong
directed at the audience member. Since the mishap was directed at the experimenter,
these behaviors might differ if the person entering the room after the mishap was not the
one that was 'wronged', but instead was a child or adult with whom to play. It would be
interesting to examine the differences in children's reactions to mishaps when someone
unconnected to the event was present, versus the person who was affected. It is likely
that in such a situation, the child's emotional and behavioral reactions would decrease, as
there would be less of a need to avoid the audience member.
Contrary to expectations, commenting before or after being prompted, denying or
minimizing the damage, and confession before being prompted by the experimenter did
not differ as a function of age. This was surprising given that previous research using
mishap paradigms has found avoidant children to be slower to tell the experimenter when
a mishap occurred (Barrett et al., 1993). Although the definition of confession in the

present study was consistent with telling or commenting about the broken toy, the lack of
findings may be related to the absence of the parent during testing. In Barrett and
colleagues' mishap paradigm (1993), the parent remained with the child in the testing
room even though the experimenter had left. In contrast, children in the present study
were alone when the toy broke, perhaps allowing them to think that no one knew that the
toy had been broken or that they were responsible. It should be noted that only 5 of the
6 1 children confessed before the experimenter prompted them.

Once children were prompted though, it was expected that a majority of children,
especially older preschoolers, would confess. In essence, prompts acted as a way of
informing the child that the experimenter knew the toy was damaged, but without placing
specific blame on the child. Given that the child was the only one present, it would be
natural to assume that he or she was therefore 'caught'. Still, only 33% of children
confessed after being prompted. The age differences in this confession failed to reach
significance, which is not surprising given the low number of children confessing.
However, given the developmental trend present in these findings, particularly with more
4 year-olds confessing than either 2- or 3-year-olds, it is possible that older preschoolers

do confess more after being 'caught', but that the present study lacked the power to detect
these differences. These findings are consistent with empirical evidence of deception
among preschoolers. When placed with an enticing, but forbidden toy, two-thirds of the
preschoolers who 'peeked' at the toy then lied or did not respond when asked if they had
'peeked' (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989). In addition, these nonconfessors do not
differ from confessors in emotional or behavioral reactions to the experimenter's probe.

In contrast, when probed for information in another context, such as trying to hide a toy

from the experimenter, 3-year-olds do attempt to deceive the experimenter, but often leak
information, and are therefore unsuccesshl (LaFreniere, 1988; see also Chandler, Fritz, &
Hala, 1989). Taken together, these findings suggest that younger preschool children may
attempt to deceive others, but lack the cognitive sophistication to hlly understand the
other person's thoughts and perceptions.
The awareness of another's knowledge base, such as is necessary in deception, is
one of the fundamental cognitive components of the preschooler's emerging theory of
mind. Given that guilt and shame are particularly cognitive emotions, it is not surprising
that many of the developmental patterns found in the present study parallel the age
changes in the development of theory of mind. In addition to deception, preschool
children are increasingly capable of belief-desire reasoning, and of understanding the
appearance-reality distinction (see Flavell, 2000, for a review). Although researchers have
consistently found that children do not pass false-belief tasks (Wimrner & Pemer, 1983)
or appearance-reality tasks (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986) until they are about 4-yearsold, several studies have challenged these findings as relying on too narrow a definition
for these abilities. For example, children as young as 3-years-old are capable of knowing
that emotions depend on desires and beliefs (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991), and that
appearance and reality do not always match in everyday objects (Wooley & Wellman,
1990). It is not surprising then, that many of the emotional and behavioral differences
found in children's reactions to the mishap paradigm were between 2-year-olds and older
preschoolers.
Finally, as only 33% confessed, using the classification of guilt- and shame-prone,
as originally designed revealed that only 7 children were guilt-prone (i.e., high in

confession and low in avoidance). As mentioned above, confession was relatively
uncomnlon for preschoolers; therefore only measures of avoidance were used to create
the avoidant and nonavoidant classification in the present study. As such, 26 children
were nonavoidant and 35 avoidant. As hypothesized, classification as avoidant or
nonavoidant did vary as a function of age. This finding is lends support to Sroufe's
(1995) tenet that guilt develops during the preschool years from a more global emotional
reaction reflected in shame. In addition, the dichotomy of children into avoidant and
nonavoidant groups reflects previous research that has found, using a similar
classification strategy, that amending toddlers do exhibit many emotional and behavioral
responses consistent with the experience of guilt (Barrett et al., 1993). Alternatively,
given that guilt could not be directly addressed with this classification system, preschool
children may not be capable of experiencing full-fledged guilt. Nonavoidant responding
may simply reflect a mixed emotional response that indicates a transition from shame, as
seen in younger preschoolers, to guilt, which may be fully formed later in development.
Given the mixed developmental findings with respect to changes from 2- to 3- and 2- to
4-years-old, guilt and shame may exist along a single dimension, creating the possibility
that there are actually 3 groups (e.g., guilt-prone, shame-prone, and mixed). The mixed
emotional and behavioral responses seen in preschool children suggest that guilt may not
develop during the preschool years. Rather, these findings suggest that nascent forms of
guilt are beginning to emerge during this developmental period. Additionally, these age
effects might not reflect a developmental sequence from global shame to specific guilt
since the study was cross sectional in nature. Future studies could investigate the
developmental progression of these emotions longitudinally.

Situation and Affect
Verbal directions to the participants were designed to elicit or reduce feelings of
personal responsibility in children. If children are told that the toy is already broken, for
example, it is likely that they will not feel personally responsible if the toy does in fact
break. Conversely, if they are given no information about the toy being broken, than they
should be more likely to blame themselves or see themselves as personally responsible
for breaking the toy. Given that guilt is theoretically linked to feelings of personal
responsibility (Lewis, 1993; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 1986), it was expected
that children would display more guilt relevant reactions in this situation. Contrary to
expectations, children in the personal responsibility condition showed a pattern of
behavioral reactions such as greater avoidance and less reparation, which is typically
associated with shame, not guilt (e.g., Lewis, 1993). It is possible that although personal
responsibility is one of the constructs that differentiates guilt from other emotions,
individual differences rather than context will elicit these feelings. Alternatively, as
research with hypothetical situations and interviews suggests (e.g., Graybill, 1993; Stipek
& DeCostis, 1988; Weiner & Graham, 1989) awareness of personal responsibility as a

factor in guilt may not emerge during this developmental period.
Affective Expressions
Findings in the present study did not support the hypothesis that children's
affective expressions would differ as a function of the degree of personal responsibility.
When the child was alone, only full joy was seen to decrease from baseline more in the
personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition. In
addition, children expressed more mild fear in the ambiguous responsibility condition

than in the personal responsibility condition when the experimenter was present. This was
surprising given that fear is hypothesized to signal knowledge of impending danger
(Darwin, 187211965; Izard, 1993). It may be that children expressed mild fear when the
experimenter returned because of the possibility of punishment. In addition, the finding
that these expressions occurred more often in the ambiguous responsibility condition as
opposed to the personal responsibility condition suggests that children were more fearful
about the encounter with the experimenter when they had already been warned that the
toy was broken and to be careful with it, but played with it and broke it anyway. This is
consistent with research that demonstrates that early elementary school age children
attribute shame or pride to story characters only when a parent is present (Harter &
Whitesell, 1989). As Stipek (1995) notes, self-conscious emotions emerge after a child
internalizes rules and standards, so that emotional reactions are no longer dependent on
the evaluation of others. In the present study, children's emotional reactions when alone
likely reflected a self-conscious evaluation, but these emotional reactions may have been
intensified or altered with the presence of an audience member. Finally, early elementary
age children mention that guilt is more likely or will increase, but that shame will
decrease if a parent were present (Berti et al., 2000). However, the shame situations
frequently reflected embarrassment, making the role of an audience member unclear in
the easement or intensification of these emotions.
Behavioral Reactions
When children were initially alone after the toy broke, children in the personal
responsibility condition had longer latencies to repair and displayed more self-comforting
behavior such as biting their lips or playing with their hair. In contrast, children in the

ambiguous responsibility condition were quicker to repair the toy than those in the
personal responsibility condition since they were primed for this event to occur. This may
reflect differences in the speed of processing a novel or unexpected event when compared
to an event that was expected. Although not significant, the trend for children in the
personal responsibility condition to try to leave the room more frequently is consistent
with the general pattern of avoidant behavior. Alternatively, they may have been
attempting to get help from the experimenter, as they had not expected the toy would
break. The reason the child left the room was not assessed in this study, but given the
low frequency of its occurrence, it is unlikely that analyses of these reasons would be
meaningful in the present study.
Overall, this pattern suggests that chlldren in the personal responsibility condition
might have been experiencing shame rather than guilt as it was designed to do. The
apparent paradox may be explained by the fact that children in the ambiguous
responsibility condition had been warned by the experimenter that not only was the toy
'her favorite' but also that they should be careful, since it was already broken. Given the
lack of consistent avoidant or nonavoidant responses as a function of condition, it is not
surprising that the avoidant and nonavoidant classification was not related to this
manipulation. Taken together, these findings suggest that the verbal instructions, although
somewhat important, were not powerful enough to elicit an increase in feelings of guilt.
In addition, the verbal instructions in some ways created patterns that were opposed to

those hypothesized. As such, it was not easy to induce feelings of personal responsibility
in the present study. As Saarni (1999) notes, the cognitive egocentrism of preschool
children may make them more likely to think that they are responsible for events which

they actually have little or no control over. In the present study, it is reasonable to assume
that children felt responsible for breaking the toy regardless of whether the toy was
already broken or not, but these feelings of responsibility did not induce guilt, but rather
shame.
Age and Situation
Affective Expressions
When comparing the responsibility conditions within each age group, a more
consistent pattern of affective expressions emerged. Specifically, within each age group,
several negative emotions were more frequently expressed in the ambiguous
responsibility condition than in the personal responsibility condition. For instance, when
children were alone, 3-year-olds expressed more full anger and blends of fear with
sadness in the anlbiguous than the personal responsibility condition. When the
experimenter was present, both 2- and 3-year-olds expressed mild fear displays
suggesting that they were afraid of being punished.
When initially alone, and when the experimenter returned, 4-year-olds expressed
more joy blended with tension/wony when they had been told that the toy might be
broken than when they were not warned that the toy was broken. It is likely that the
blending of these emotions is not a sign of ambivalent positive and negative feelings, but
rather a nervous smile that was meant to ease the situation. Although expressions of
embarrassment were not examined, it is possible that these anxious smiles reflected this
emotion. Consistent with this interpretation, Barrett and colleagues (1993) found that
children high in avoidance display more smiles followed by gaze aversion. These findings
are in contrast to the present study, but may reflect the differences in the children's ages

(i.e., toddlers versus preschoolers) or the fact that there was a longer delay before the
experimenter prompted the child in Barrett and colleagues' study. As such, the shorter
time between the experimenter's return and the experimenter's prompts may have masked
some individual differences that would reflect an avoider's discomfort with the situation.
Behavioral Reactions
As with affective expressions, findings regarding behavioral reactions were in an
unexpected direction. Interestingly, latency to repair appeared to be the most important
variable examined in the present study, as it consistently differentiated age groups, and
responsibility conditions, as well as the interaction of these variables, and was important
in differentiating guilt and shame reactions in previous studies (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993).
In particular, 2-year-olds took much longer to attempt to repair the toy when they had not
been told it was broken. This finding has several implications. First, it suggests that the
age effect for latency to repair, whereby 2-year-olds were slower to repair, is not likely
due to psychomotor differences. When examining responses to the responsibility
conditions within this age group, 2-year-olds attempted to repair the toy as quickly as
older preschoolers when they had been warned that the toy was broken. It was when they
were not primed for this event that they appeared much slower than their older peers. It is
likely that latency to repair reflects cognitive and experiential differences, as well as
emotional ones. Future studies could explore the significance of latency to repair, as this
variable has begun to emerge as an important individual response to mishap situations,
yet it remains unclear whether the behavior relates to cognitive processing differences or
emotional coping styles, or both.

Finally, 3-year-olds continued to display more affection towards the toy in the
ambiguous responsibility condition when the experimenter was present. Although 2-yearolds showed a trend for displaying more self-comfort and more gaze aversion in the
personal responsibility condition, these behaviors failed to differ with respect to the
responsibility conditions. It is likely that the present study lacked the power to detect
these differences, possibly due to sample size. On the other hand, given the inconsistent
and somewhat weak effects of the responsibility condition generally, the present study
may have lacked power in the manipulation of the verbal instructions. Future research
could examine the importance of situational differences in eliciting shame and guilt in
preschool children.
Individual Differences
Classification
Examination of the dichotomy revealed that the classification of children as
avoidant or nonavoidant was theoretically meaningful, whether or not it reflects guilt and
shame-prone responding. This is consistent with previous research that has found shameprone children to be higher in avoidance and tensionlwony (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole
et al., 1992; Lewis, 1992) and guilt prone children to be higher in sadness and have
shorter latencies to repair and point out the mishap (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole et al.,
1992). However, an examination of the variables that contributed to this dichotomy
should be interpreted with caution. Since the subject to variable ratio of the DFA was
quite small, too many variables may have been included as "some variables will likely be
included which do not contribute to the separation of groups.. .[and] a different subset
would emerge from the repetition of the study" (Rancher & Larson, 1980, p. 350, as cited

in Stevens, 1996, p. 272). This is consistent with the fact that, although age was related to
avoidant and nonavoidant classification, it did not weigh heavily in the discrimination of
groups. As such, generalization of these findings as a true indicator of the variables that
discriminate between avoidant and nonavoidant responding, and particularly as
discriminators of guilt from shame, seems unwarranted. On the other hand, emotion
variables, particularly joy blended with tensiodwony, discriminated between these
groups, as did affection and self-comfort. The results of the DFA can therefore be useful
in directing the design of future studies to limit the number of variables examined and to
increase the sample size, so that a more stable DFA can be examined. In addition, the
present study was unable to analyze the importance of behaviors related to reparation
such as confession or minimizing the mishap. Given the importance of these variables in
the theoretical differentiation of guilt and shame, future research could examine how
reparations aid in the discrimination of these emotions among preschoolers.

In addition, the discriminant function analysis assumes that the groups being
examined are mutually exclusive categories. Although guilt and shame are conceptualized
as mutually exclusive, it is possible that guilt- and shame-prone responding to a single
mishap incident has some degree of overlap. For instance, whereas tensiodwony reflects
shame-prone responding, the expression of this emotion is not precluded fiom children
classified as nonavoidant. In addition, tensiodwony decreased with age, but sad and
tensiodwony blends increased with age, further suggesting that these may not be
mutually exclusive in terms of emotional expressions. It is likely that, although the
groups are theoretically distinct, their expressive components have considerable overlap.
Alternatively, the fundamental significance of the dichotomy is not without value, as the

variables did separate the groups in theoretically meaningful ways. As Klecka (1982)
notes "if the groups are not very different in the variables being analyzed, then all of the
correlations will be low, because we cannot create discrimination when none already
exists" (pp. 37-38). As such, the specific variables that discriminate may be unstable, but
the dichotomy itself is likely to be meaningful.
Gender Differences
Findings in the present study did not support the notion that avoidant and
nonavoidant responding varied as a h c t i o n of gender. This was not surprising given the
inconsistency of gender findings in the literature, especially in young children (see Bybee,
1999 for a review). Recent studies using semi-structured interviews and hypothetical
situations revealed few or no gender differences in young children's understanding of the
antecedents, consequences, or action tendencies (e.g., Berti et al., 2000; Olthof et al.,
2000), or in the likelihood of being classified as guilt- or shame-prone (Ferguson, Stegge,
Eye, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000). Additionally, the limitations of the present study's
avoidant classification system do not fully reflect the overall constructs of guilt and
shame. As such, gender findings should be interpreted with caution.
Affective and Behavioral Differences
Hypotheses regarding the emotional and behavioral differences in avoidant and
nonavoidant children were partially supported in the present study. Only joy differed for
avoidant and nonavoidant children, with nonavoidant children showing a greater decrease
in mild joy both when alone and when the experimenter was present. Although the
present study may have lacked sufficient power, there was a trend for avoidant children to
express more fear blended with tensionlwony, specifically when the experimenter

returned to the room. However, this finding does raise an interesting theoretical issue
about how researchers can distinguish the separate emotions of shame and fear of
punishment. The expressive and cognitive differences in attempting to avoid punishment
versus reducing feelings of shame may have overlapping elements. Darwin (187211965)
noted that fear is often expressed at first as a freezing of the body, "as if instinctively to
escape observation" (p. 290), and that with shame "there is a strong desire for
concealment" (p. 320). It is likely that fear of punishment may be associated with selfconscious emotions such as shame, as it reflects awareness that one has violated a
standard.
Behavioral differences between avoidant and nonavoidant responding reflected
the affective differences noted above. Nonavoiders had shorter latencies to repair, as was
expected given that guilt is associated with reparation rather than avoidance. This adds
fkther support to the identification of nonavoiders as experiencing guilt during the
mishap paradigm. In addition, avoiders were more likely to try to leave the room,
suggesting that they were uncomfortable and unable to remain regulated in the face of
arousal. This is consistent with research that demonstrates that young children frequently
cite reparation has a method of coping with guilt, and hiding or "doing nice things and
forgetting or distracting" as methods of coping with shame (Berti et al., 2000). As Barrett
(1995) notes, shame may be a method of coping used by children as a means of dealing
with overarousal in a social situation such that children manage the arousal by directing
their attention away from the incident or person. In addition, Denham (1998) notes that
awareness of one's arousal and how one redirects attention away from that arousal, is
indicative of emotion regulation. In particular, redirecting attention away from feelings of

arousal may be adaptive in situations when a child experiences anxiety, but may be
maladaptive if it damages the social bond. Children who experience shame may be
unable to modulate their arousal in ways that would repair the damage to the social
relationship, making it a less adaptive response, especially for older children who would
be expected to have greater emotion regulation.
Socioemotional Differences
Nonavoiders, when compared to avoiders, were rated by their teachers as more
socially competent overall, even when controlling for age. These findings suggest that
nonavoidant responding reflects a child's quality of adaptation in the preschool classroom
such that avoidance is not characteristic of a socially competent preschool child. One
interpretation of these findings that is consistent with what is known about guilt and
shame in young children is that shame-prone responding is less adaptive than guilt-prone
responding, and will reflect differences in social competence. Although results of the
present study suggest that avoidant classification makes a unique contribution to social
competence beyond its relationship with age, it remains unclear how to tease apart these
constructs. For example, perhaps guilt and its expression are aspects of social competence
such that children who express remorse for wrongdoings are likely to be more positively
rated by their teachers. This is consistent with research by Holmgren, Eisenberg, and
Fabes (1998) that has demonstrated that teachers rate children who are high in empathy as
more socially competent than those who are low in measures of empathy. On the other
hand, perhaps teachers do not notice the expression of guilt and shame per se, but are
rating these children more positively due to their overall coping style. Future research

could examine the relationship between social competence as rated by teachers, and as
reflected in peer relations, and children's proneness to experiencing shame or guilt.
In addition to global scales of the SCBE, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders,

were rated as more tolerant, prosocial, and cooperative. As the SCBE scales reflect both
positive and negative behaviors, avoiders were therefore rated as more angry, egotistical,
and oppositional than were nonavoiders. As such, these children were also high in
externalizing behaviors. Although this was expected, it is surprising that they did not
differ in internalizing behavior as well. Overall, the avoidant response style would
suggest an inability to regulate arousal and therefore it is likely that shame-prone children
have less effective emotional regulation strategies, in some instances through avoiding
these painful emotions. As Saarni (1999) notes, "what is intriguing about emotionally
competent coping is that often it entails having to deal with our own feelings," and that by
dealing with these emotions, we maintain our social connectedness (p. 2 19). Finally, the
present study lends support to the notion that there is a relationship between shame and
anger, as has been suggested by both psychoanalytic writers (e.g., Goldberg, 1999) and
developmental theorists (e.g., Sroufe, 1995, Tangney, et al., 1996). For example shameprone, in comparison to guilt-prone individuals, report more frequent use of maladaptive
anger management, and often lack empathy (Tangney, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996).
Concurrent Validity
Findings in regard to the My Child further support the tenet that the nonavoidant
and avoidant classifications reflect some of the theoretical differences between guilt and
shame. Although the My Child was administered as a form of concurrent validity, in that
this measure has been reported to reflect individual differences in the development of

conscience, it should be noted that the My Child was not specifically designed to test
guilt and shame. Results of the present study suggest that a nonavoidant classification
may reflect an overall proneness to guilt, given that, in comparison to avoidant children,
their parents rated nonavoidant children as higher in apology/promise not to do it again,
and reparationslamends. These scales reflect the reparations that are consistently used to
theoretically differentiate guilt fi-om shame. In addition, these children were rated as
higher in the summary factor of active moral regulatiodvigilance such that nonavoidant
children, compared to avoidant children, were rated as more concerned with rules and
prohibitions. This is consistent with previous research that has found that reactive girls as
well as impulsive and sensation seeking boys score lower on active moral
regulatiodvigilance (Kochanska et al., 1994). In contrast, children scoring high on this
scale are less likely to touch or play with a prohibited object, and instead occupy
themselves with other activities (Kochanska et al., 1994). This pattern of results suggests
that shame-prone and avoidant children may have dificulty in resisting temptation, and
are therefore more likely to be punished or reprimanded by their parents. This adds
further support to the finding that children who were told the toy might be broken were
likely to experience shame-relevant reactions, as they may have interpreted their play as a
forbidden act. In addition, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders, were rated as higher
in concern over others' wrongdoing. This is consistent with the notion that guilt-prone
children have internalized rules, and would therefore be more aware of their peers'
transgressions.

In addition, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders, also scored higher on the
summary factor of affective discomfort after wrongdoing, as was hypothesized. It is

likely that avoidant children scored lower on this scale since they are masking their
arousal following these situations, whereas nonavoiders display these emotions so as to
repair the relationship with the parent. This factor reflects not only the child's emotional
response, but also a concern for the emotional response of others and a desire to
apologize. As such, it may reflect a more empathic response focused on the social
situation rather than simply a fear of punishment or desire to hide. Interestingly, scales
within this factor represent guilt, a concern for the parent rather than the damaged object,
a need to be reassured that the parent still loves them, and empathy with others
(Kochanska et al., 1994). These scales appear to assess both shame and guilt-like
behaviors, but may represent the child's focus on the relationship and need for repair
rather than an inability to confiont the possible damage to the relationship, the latter being
more indicative of shame.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present study adds to the growing body of research on the
importance of the development of guilt and its differentiation fiom shame in preschool
children, several limitations to the validity and generalizability of the findings are worth
mentioning. First, the participants of the study were primarily limited to white, middleand working class families. As such, it is unclear if these developmental and individual
difference findings would generalize to a more diverse population.
Second, although the results of the present study supports the notion that
nonavoidant responding is more adaptive emotional and behavioral reaction than avoidant
responding, adaptation is meant to imply only particular contexts. Specifically, the
cultural implications of these findings should not be over-extended. It should be noted

that researchers have begun to explore the role of culture in the development of selfconscious emotions (see Wallbott & Scherer, 1998 for a review). Several studies have
suggested that children's predominant shame or guilt reactions may reflect their
prevailing collectivistic or individualistic cultural context. In particular, shame is more
prevalent than guilt in collectivistic cultures, but within the socialization experiences of
those cultures, shame is likely to be adaptive (Chiang, Barrett, & Nunez, 2000). In
addition, although shame may have similar expressive components cross-culturally, it
will likely have different experiential components. For example, parents in collectivistic
cultures report that a child's misdeed reflects on the parent more than do parents in
individualistic cultures (Chiang et al., 2000). Since misdeeds in a collectivistic culture
are reflective of the parent as well as the child, shame experiences may be a more social
and shared experience between the parent and child, whereas shame is a solitary emotion
within individualistic cultures, felt only by the child (Saami, 1999). Several studies have
pointed to the adaptive as well as maladaptive nature of these emotions, but the
expressive and experiential components that may make these emotions positive or
negative in various cultures are not well understood (Ferguson et al., 2000; Ferguson,
Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999).
Third, age effects in the present study may have been artificially heightened by
linguistic, cognitive, and expressive language differences between 2-year-olds and older

.

preschool children. Behavioral categories were defined with these linguistic differences in
mind. For example, telling the experimenter was defined not only as verbalizing that the
arm was broken, but also as deliberately showing the experimenter that the arm was

broken. In addition, simple utterances such as saying "I broke" were considered to be

examples of confession. It remains unclear whether these linguistic considerations were
sufficient enough to allow less verbal children (e.g., 2-year-olds) to be accurately
classified as nonavoidant, but instead made them likely to be classified as avoidant purely
based on linguistic differences. Future research could examine verbal ability as a
potential factor in the classification of guilt and shame.
Additionally, it should be noted that although behaviors and affect were compared
to baseline free play, children were not presented with a broken toy during baseline. As
Kagan (1981) notes, 2-year-olds are fascinated and sometimes distressed by broken or
tom objects. In the present study, although 2-year-olds expressed more tensiodworry
than did 3-year-olds, children in each age group expressed some tensiodworry,
suggesting that these emotional reactions may reflect more than distress over a broken
object, but distress over having caused the damage. Nevertheless, age differences
between 2-year-olds and older preschool children in the present study should be
interpreted taking into account Kagan's work.
The relevance of the broken toy paradigm for children of this age has face
validity, and likely internal validity as well, as this is a fairly common experience for
young children. However, the artifact of breaking a toy belonging to an adult, and in a
controlled environment, may not accurately reflect natural mishaps. Several controls were
used to regulate the artifice of the design. For example, children were not tested in an
unfamiliar laboratory environment, but rather in rooms that were familiar to them in their
own preschools or day care centers. In addition, children were tested only when the
experimenter had built rapport with the child. It should be noted that younger children
seemed to take longer to build rapport. This was expected, as 2-year-olds are less socially

competent than are older preschoolers (e.g., LaFreniere et al., 1992; Rubin, Bukowski, &
Parker, 1998; Sroufe, 1995). However, given that amount of time per se was not
controlled (rather degree of comfort with the experimenter was) it is possible that the age
effects in the study are due to the confound between age and the amount of time spent
with the experimenter. Although this point can be argued, the variability within each age
group in children's ability to build rapport with the experimenter likely counteracts the
variability between each age group. It is possible that shame-prone children need more
rapport building time, as they are also less socially competent. In addition, Sullivan
(2001) found that preschool children express more embarrassment and more pride, but
not more shame, when tested by a familiar versus an unfamiliar exanliner. Future
research could continue to explore the role of familiarity with the audience member in the
expression of these self-conscious emotions.

In conclusion, the present study supports the notion that shame is a developmental
precursor to guilt, and that these emotions can further signal individual differences in
adaptive strategies. To date, many questions about the expression of these emotions
remain unanswered, as the expression of these emotions is often unclear. As Darwin
noted, "with social animals, the power of intercommunication between members of the
same community.. .is of highest importance to them" (1872/1965, p. 60). It is surprising
then, that emotions that can mend or damage the social bond, and which refer to our
actions and inactions in reference to the group, are expressed with such variety, and are so
poorly understood. It is hoped that the present study can inform researchers about the
development of guilt and shame, and the potential impact that these emotions have on
children's socioemotional functioning.
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Appendix A

Informed Consent Form

Dear Parents or Guardians,
As a fifth year graduate student, I am working on a study as part of my doctoral
dissertation at the University of Maine, and I am looking for parents and children who are
willing to take part in the study. This study looks at preschool children and how they react
to everyday events. I will be looking at how children react when a toy breaks, and how
these reactions change with age. Specifically, I am looking at how preschool children
become able to express responsibility. I am interested in how these behaviors relate to
children's behavior in the classroom.
Your child will be asked to take part in one short session that will last no more
than 10 minutes. This session will done at your child's school, and will be run by an
adult that your child knows well. I will tell your child that they can end the session at any
time and for any reason. Your child will be shown a small broken toy and will be told it
belongs to the researcher. This part of the study will be videotaped so that we can
identify how your child responds to the broken toy. The child may not be told that the toy
is broken, but will find out when he or she plays with it, so it is important that you do not
mention this to your child. Your child may think that helshe broke the toy. I assume that
some children may feel mild guilt if they think that they have broken the toy, but it should
be like everyday mishaps that children experience. At the end of this session, I will
reassure your child that the toy was already broken, and is easily fixed. I will also give
your child a small prize (such as stickers) for hisher participation.
Videotaping
Many of the behaviors that we are looking for are often difficult to identify since
they do not last very long (such as a smile or frown, hand and body movements, and eye
contact). To find which children show these behaviors, it will be necessary to use a
videocamera. The videocamera will be placed in a room across the hall from the testing
room, and the door of the room will remain open throughout the study. The room is
equipped with a one-way mirror. Parents are invited to watch their child fiom behind this
one-way mirror if they wish to see how their child reacts to this session. The videotape of
your child will later be coded by student raters, who will not know your child. These
raters will look at short clips of the videotape to find the number of times that certain
behaviors happen.
Confidentiality
Any information that is gathered about your child will be identified only with a
confidential numerical identification code, which will be known only by me. No other
identifying marks or names will be attached to any information that you or your child's
teacher provides. All information about your child will be stored in a locked office. The
data that you provide will only be used for the present study, and all ID codes and
videotapes will be destroyed when the study is completed. Some parents may be
contacted to get permission to use the tape for future educational purposes, but videotapes
will not be used unless express permission is given at that time. All other videotapes will
be destroyed when the study is completed.

Questionnaire Packet
In this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaire with questions about
your child's reactions to several types of everyday happenings. Please remember that
although you may want to answer these questions so that you and your child appear in the
best light, it is helpful if you answer these questions as truthfully and objectively as
possible. You may skip any question you do not want to answer. You will be asked to rate
how much you agree with questions about your child, such as: my child "may 'freeze' in
place when caught doing something bad,' and "will spontaneously say 'sorry' after having
done something wrong." This questionnaire will take about half an hour to complete.
So that I can understand how your child acts outside the home, I will also be
asking your child's teacher to fill out one questionnaire about how your child acts in the
classroom. For example, teachers will be asked how often your child "delights in playing
with other children" and "goes unnoticed in a group."
Risks and Benefits
The researchers that will be conducting these sessions will all have considerable
experience with children of this age. We will strive to put your child at ease in this novel
situation and provide positive feedback to hinw'her. We hope that our attempts to make
these activities fun and interesting will be successful. Children generally enjoy the
individual attention that they receive in these sessions, and also enjoy the chance to get a
small prize. Finally, these methods have been used in many research studies, and there
are no known side effects associated with them. We will end the session if your child
seems distressed, and we will quickly resolve any reactions by explaining that the toy was
already broken, and by showing the child the toy is easy to fix.
If you have any questions, you may contact me, or my faculty advisor at the number listed
below.
Thank you,

Jamie Walter
Graduate Student
Developmental Psychology
581-2071
You may also contact:
Peter LaFreniere, Ph.D.
Director, Child Study Center
Professor of Psychology
58 1-2044

Pennission Form

I have read the Informed Consent Form, and I understand that all the data will be
identified only with a confidential ID code number that will be known only by the
primary investigator. All sessions will be conducted by an adult known to my child, and
my child will be told that helshe can withdraw at any time. The short videotape will be
viewed only by the primary investigator and student coders that do not know the children.
I understand that my participation is voluntary. I give permission for my child to
participate in the study in the manner that it has been described to me and for my child's
teacher to complete one questionnaire about my child. I understand that I will also be
asked to fill out a questionnaire.
Name:
Signature:
Your relationship to the child:
Date:
Phone Number: (optional)

Appendix B
My Child

PLEASE READ THIS PAGE BEFORE STARTING
You will see descriptions of young children's behaviors in typical daily situations. Many
refer to children's reactions when they get into mischief, and are very common for
toddlers and preschoolers. Please tell us how true each description is for your child.
Circle #
1

If the statement is:
Extremely untrue of your child; s h e would be extremely
unlikely to react in this way in this situation; not at all
characteristic of h i h e r

Quite untrue of your child; s h e would be very unlikely to react in
this way in this situation
Slightly untrue of your child; s h e would be rather unlikely to
react
in this way in this situation

May be true, may be untrue; neither true or untrue of your
child's reaction in this situation; maybe
Slightly true of your child; s h e would be rather likely to react in
this way in this situation
Quite true of your child; s h e would be very likely to react in this
way in this situation
Extremely true of your child; s h e would be extremely likely to
react in this way in this situation; very characteristic of h i h e r
All answers are OK; all behaviors described here are normal and common. Young
children differ very much in how they respond to different situations. Also,
children of different ages behave very differently. For example, most 2-year-olds
get into trouble or mischief when unsupervised. These individual and age
differences are exactly what we are studying.
Please circle NA only if you cannot remember your child ever being in this situation;
for example, of the description says "Rarely cries or looks upset when watching a sad TV
show", and your child never watches TV. However, most situations are typical for all
young children; most parents will rarely need to circle NA.

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ EACH ITEM VERY CAREFULLY

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

slightly
true

1. Will try to comfort or reassure another in distress.
1
2
3
4
5

quite
true

extremely
true

6

7

NA

7

NA

2. Is likely to scold another child who violates a household rule.
1
2
3
4
5
6

3. Not particularly concerned or worried when s h e was broken a valuable object.
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
1

4. Likely to offer toys or candy to a crying playmate even without parental suggestion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
5. Likely to try a prohibited but attractive activity when alone.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

6. Will spontaneously clean up toys, even without being asked.
2
3
4
5
6
1

7

NA

7. May "freeze" in place when caught doing something bad.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

8. Will spontaneously say "sorry" after having done something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

9. May deny that s h e did something wrong even if confronted with the evidence.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA

10. If asked to do something tedious (for example, clean up hisher toys), s h e is likely to
complete the task without further supervision.
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
1
11. May occasionally tease a pet if unsupervised.
2
3
4
5
1

6

7

NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

slightly
quite
true
true

extremely
true

.......................................................................
12. When s h e does something naughty, this subject of wrongdoing is likely to come up
during hisher play.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
13. Feels good when good things happen to movie characters.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

14. During "pretend" play with peers, may re-enact themes of wrongdoing or mischief
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
15. Remembers for a long time past mishaps or instances when s h e did something
wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
16. Unless specifically asked to do so, s h e is not likely to apologize on hisher own.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
17. Acts upset when s h e sees a hurt animal.
1
2
3
4

6

7

NA

18. Likely to feel responsible whenever anything goes wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

5

19. Likely to look remorseful or guilty when caught in the middle of a forbidden activity.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
20. After doing something naughty, may replay that situation with toys.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

2 1. Does not seem upset when s h e breaks a new toy.
1
2
3
4
5

NA

6

7

22. Has to be reminded to say "sorry" when s h e has done something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

23. When s h e has hurt a playmate, will try to make up for it by offering toys or prized
possession to the other child.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
truenor
untrue

slightly
quite
true
true

extremely
true

.......................................................................
24. Likely to become quiet or subdued after doing something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

25. Feels bad when reminded about past mischief or wrong doing.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

26. Shows concern or makes a comment when comes to a tom page in a book.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
27. May have trouble sleeping or poor appetite after having done something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
28. During play, will introduce themes of wrongdoing or rules (for example, scold a teddy
bear for being naughty).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
29. Rarely cries or looks upset when watching a sad TV show.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

30. It is easy to bring himher to tears when discussing something that s h e has done
wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
3 1. Even attractively wrapped presents can be left within hisher reach because s h e is not
likely to tamper with them.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
32. Rarely repeats previously prohibited behavior even if adult is not present.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

33. Likely to show spontaneous nurturing and care-giving behavior towards an animal.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
34. Seems relieved when given an opportunity to repair a damage s h e has caused.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
35. It is enough to prohlbit something once and s h e will probably not do it even when
alone.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
slightly
quite
truenor true
true
untrue

extremely
true

.......................................................................
36. May confess to doing something naughty even if unlikely to be found out.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

37. After having been naughty, seems to want reassurance that parent is no longer angry
with himher.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
38. Is upset by criticism.
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

NA

39. Shows interest when TV or story characters act naughty.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

40. Hisher feelings are not easily hurt by criticism.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

NA

41. Will try to stop another child from getting into trouble.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

42. Can tell at just a glance how others are feeling.
1
2
3
4
5

7

NA

7

NA

6

43. Not likely to react when a visiting friend breaks a household rule.
1
2
3
4
5
6

44. If left alone with another child, will not try to keep them both out of trouble.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
45. When watching TV or listening to a story, seems particularly interested in issues of
responsibility, wrongdoing, etc.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
46. Shows concern when a toy is broken.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

NA

47. May continue to feel bad even if forgiven for a mishap or blunder.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
truenor
untrue

slightly
true

quite
true

extremely
true

48. Not particularly likely to offer to clean up if s h e has caused a mess (for example, a

spill).
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

NA

49. On hisher own, is likely to promise not to do it again after doing something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
50. After having done something naughty, asks to be forgiven.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

5 1. Does not need to be reminded to say "sorry" when s h e does something bad.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
52. If out of a parent's sight, may ignore a household rule.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

53. If asked to do a chore (for example, help set the table), s h e does not need to be

reminded about it.
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

NA

54. Can stop herhimself in the middle of doing something forbidden without any

intervention from an adult.
1
2
3

4

5

55. Gets upset when a guest breaks a household rule.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

NA

6

7

NA

56. After being scolded for some mischief, seems particularly happy when parent praises

h i d e r for some accomplishment.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

NA

57. Is not overly concerned about being forgiven after having done something naughty.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

slightly
quite
true
true

extremely
true

.......................................................................
58. Likely to ask "what's wrong?" when seeing someone in distress.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

59. Will spontaneously say "sorry" to a playmate or sibling when necessary.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

60. If not supervised, may get sloppy about hisher chores.
1
2
3
4
5
6

NA

7

61. It is not easy to make himher feel bad after s h e has done something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
62. On hisher own, will rarely pick up things that are out of place.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

63. Seems happy after doing a good job with a task or chore, even before others
comment.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
64. When s h e does something wrong, seems to feel relieved when forgiven.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

65. Gets angry at aggressor, "Bad Guy", who hurts a TV character.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

66. Not likely to pay attention to or comment on dirty or tom clothing.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

67. Will spontaneously admit fault or wrongdoing, either verbally or nonverbally.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
68. Tries hisher best when doing chores.
1
2
3
4

5

6

7

NA

69. If asked to do something, may not finish if not reminded.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

slightly
true

quite
true

extremely
true

70. Not too upset by mishaps or accidents s h e has caused (for example, spilling or
breaking something).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
7 1. Eager to make amends for doing something naughty.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

NA

72. May draw parent's attention to mishap or damage s h e has caused (for example,
"Mark done it" or "broke").
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
73. On hisher own, will share household rules with a playmate at our home (for example,
what is not allowed in the house).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
74. After breaking something, doesn't seem particularly concerned about fixing the
damage.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
75. Is upset by stories in which characters are hurt or die.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

NA

76. Presents have to be well hidden because s h e will tamper with them if left alone.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
77. Clearly hesitates before doing something forbidden, even when alone.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

78. Seems relieved after s h e has confessed to a wrongdoing.
1
2
3
4
5
6

NA

7

79. AAer doing something s h e is not supposed to do, may later check with parent to see
if s h e is "good now".
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
80. May become extra nice toward the parent after being caught doing something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA

extremely
untrue

quite
untrue

slightly
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

slightly
true

quite
true

extremely
true

8 1. When s h e as caused some damage (for example, dropped or broken an object), will
try to put the pieces together, clean up, etc.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
82. When s h e breaks a toy during play, simply moves to another activity or other toys.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
83. Seems compelled to tell parents when s h e does something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

84. Shows interest when other people's wrongdoing is discussed.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

85. In play, may scold a doll or stuffed toy for imaginary wrongdoing.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NA

86. May not tell parent's when s h e has broken something.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

87. Likely to get into mischief when no adult is present.
1
2
3
4
5

7

NA

7

NA

6

88. Will feel sorry for other people who are hurt, sick, or unhappy.
1
2
3
4
5
6

89. Will not complete a tedious task (for example, cleaning up hisher room), unless
reminded.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
90. When unsupervised, is likely to stop himherself on hisher own when just about to do
something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
9 1 . Likely to blush when caught doing something wrong.
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

NA

1

2

3

4

extreme11y
untrue

quite
untrue

slight11y
untrue

neither
true nor
untrue

5

slightl~
I
quite
true
true

extremely
true

92. Can be left alone even with hisher favorite dessert and will not touch it if asked to
wait until the guests arrive.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
93. When having a fiend over, is not likely to enforce family rules on hisher own.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
94. Wants to stay physically closer to parent after being scolded for doing something
wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
95. Pays attention to objects that are broken, do not work, or out of order (for example,
missing buttons, broken toys, stained clothes, etc.).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
96. Avoids eye contact if s h e has done something naughty.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

97. Is not likely to become upset if a playmate cries.
1
2
3
4
5

7

NA

6

98. Is casual about spills or damages that s h e has caused (for example, may suggest that
the spill will dry by itself).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
99. May hang hisher head and look down after being naughty.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

100. Likely to get upset if s h e does something wrong in public.
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

NA

Appendix C

Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation-Preschool Edition

Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation-Preschool Edition
The following is a list of statements describing a child in three broad categories:
emotional adjustment, social interactions with peers, and social interactions with adults.
Use the following scale to rate the child by circling one choice for each statement to
indicate the child's typical behavior or emotional state. Each of the ratings indicates how
often a typical emotional state or behavior occurs:
Rating
Description
1
Almost NEVER occurs.
SOMETIMES occurs.
2 or 3
4or5
OFTEN occurs.
6
Almost ALWAYS occurs.
Make every effort to assign a rating to each statement; leave an item blank only if
you have no way of evaluating the child on the particular statement. If more than a few
items are left without any ratings, the results may not be meaningful.
Never Sometimes Often Always

1. Enjoys demonstrating new songs, games and
other things helshe has learned.. ................................ 1.. .2.. . 3 . . .4.. .5.. .6
2. Maintains neutral facial expression (doesn't smile or laugh). .. 1...2.. . 3 . . .4.. .5.. .6
3. Sensitive to another's problems.. ..................................

1...2.. . 3 . . .4.. .5.. .6

4. Wets or dirties pants at school.. ..................................... 1. ..2. ..3.. .4.. .5.. .6
5. Curious.. ................................................................ 1.. .2.. .3.. .4.. .5.. .6
6. Tired.. .................................................................

1..-2..-3..-4..-5...6

7. Easily frustrated. ....................................................... . l . ..2. ..3. .-4..-5.. -6

8. Gets angry when interrupted.. ........................................ . l . ..2.. .3.. .4.. .5.. .6
9. Looks directly at you when speaking.. .............................. . l . ..2. ..3.. .4. ..5. ..6

10. Irritable, gets mad easily.. .............................................. l . ..2.. . 3 . ..4.. .5.. .6
11. Worries. ...................................................................1..-2..- 3 ..-4...5. ..6
12. Laughs easily. ........................................................... . l . ..2. .- 3 ...4. ..5. ..6

Never Sometimes Often Always

13. Easily adjusts to new situations........................................1. ..2...3 ...4. ..5 ...6
14. Gets bored quickly and appears uninterested in playing............1. ..2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
15. In a good mood ......................................................... .1 ...2...3...4...5 ...6
16. Patient and tolerant ................................................... 1...2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
17. Takes pleasure in own accomplishments........................... 1...2. ..3. ..4. ..5. ..6
18. Tolerates interruptions and disturbances........................... 1...2 ...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
19. Difficult to console when helshe cries .............................. 1...2. ..3. ..4...5. ..6
20 . Self-confident.......................................................... 1...2...3...4 ...5 ...6
2 1. Explores hisher environment........................................ 1...2...3. ..4. ..5. ..6
22. Readily adapts to difficulties......................................... 1...2 ...3 ...4...5 ...6
23 . Timid, afraid (e.g., avoids new situations) ........................ 1...2...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
24 . Sad, unhappy or depressed..........................................

1...2. ..3. ..4. ..5. ..6

25 . Anxious, nervous (e.g., bites fingernails).......................... 1...2...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
26. Active. ready to play ................................................... 1...2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
27. Whines or complains easily.......................................... 1...2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
28 . Inhibited or uneasy in the group ....................................

1...2 ...3 ...4...5 ...6

29. Listens attentively when spoken to ................................. 1...2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
30. Screams or yells easily................................................ 1...2. ..3...4. ..5. ..6
3 1. Bullies weaker children............................................... 1...2 ...3...4 ...5 ...6
32. Forces other children to do things they don't want to do ........ 1...2...3...4 ...5 ...6
33. Gets upset when the teacher attends to another child ............ 1...2...3...4 ...5 ...6
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Never Sometimes Often Always

34. Inactive. watches the other children play ........................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
35. Negotiates solutions to conflicts with other children.............. 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
36. Remains apart, isolated fkom the group............................. 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
37. Children seek himher out to play with them ....................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
38. Does not respond to other children's invitations to play ......... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
39. Takes other children and their point of view into account....... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
40. Self-centered, does not recognize other children's interests ..... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
41. Is involved wherever the children are having lots of fun ......... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
42. Hits, bites or kicks other children................................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
43. Cooperates with other children in group activities............... 1 ...2...3...4...5...
6
44. Gets into conflict with other children.............................. 1 ...2...3...4...5...
6
45. Comforts or assists another child in difficulty.................... . 1 ...2...3...4...5...
6
46. Has to be first .......................................................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
47. Refuses to share toys .................................................. 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
48. Takes care of toys .................................................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
49. Doesn't talk or interact during group activities.................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
50. Attentive towards younger children................................. 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
51. Stays calm when there are conflicts in the group.................. 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
52. Initiates or proposes games to other children...................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6
53. Spontaneously apologized to other children for
causing a problem ..................................................... 1 ...2...3...4...5...6

Never Sometimes Often Always

54. Makes games competitive............................................ 1...2 ...3 ...4...5 ...6
55. Spontaneously helps a child pick up toys or other objects ....... 1...2 ...3...4...5 ...6
56. Delights in playing with other children............................. 1...2. ..3...4...5 ...6
57. Goes unnoticed in a group ........................................... 1...2. ..3. ..4. ..5. ..6
58. Works easily in groups............................................... 1...2...3...4...5 ...6
59. Takes pleasure in hurting other children........................... 1...2. ..3...4. ..5 ...6
60. Shares toys with other children..................................... 1...2...3 ...4...5. ..6
61. Recovers quickly when helshe falls or hurts self

(Doesn't cry very long) ..............................................

1...2. ..3. ..4...5. ..6

62. Hits teacher or destroys things when angry with teacher ........ 1...2...3...4...5 ...6
63. Helps with everyday tasks (e.g., distributing snacks)............ 1...2...3...4...5 ...6
64. Persistent in solving own problems................................. 1...2 ...3 ...4...5 ...6
65. Disrespecthl of teacher .............................................. 1...2. ..3...4. ..5 ...6
66. Accepts compromises when reasons are given .................... 1...2 ...3 ...4...5 ...6
67. Clear and direct when helshe wants something................... 1...2 ...3 ...4...5...6
68. Stops talking immediately when asked ............................. 1...2. ..3...4. ..5. ..6
69. Needs teacher's presence to h c t i o n well ......................... 1...2. ..3. ..4...5. ..6
70. Asks for help when it is unnecessary ................................ 1...2. ..3. ..4...5. ..6
7 1. Opposes the teacher's suggestions.................................. 1...2...3...4...5 ...6
72. Cries for no apparent reason ......................................... 1...2. ..3. ..4. ..5. ..6
73. Is autonomous and able to organize himherself .................. 1...2 ...3...4...5 ...6

Never Sometimes Often Always

74. Defiant when reprimanded........................................... 1 ...2. ..3. ..4. ..5 ...6
75 . Cling towards teacher in novel situations (e.g., field trip) ...... 1...2...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
76. Takes initiative in situations with new people.................... .1...2 ...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
77. Ignores directives and continues what helshe is doing ........... 1...2 ...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
78. Accepts teacher's involvement in own activity.................... 1 ...2 ...3 ...4 ...5 ...6
79. Cries when parent leaves ............................................. 1 ...2. ..3. ..4 ...5. ..6
80. Asks permission when necessary.................................... 1 ...2. ..3. ..4 ...5. ..6

Appendix D
Verbal Directions Given by the Experimenter

1. Ambiguous Responsibility. "You can play with Elmo while I take care of some things

in the other room. I think he might be broken, so take good care of him because he is my
favorite toy".

2. Personal Responsibility. "You can play with Elmo while I take care of some things in
the other room, but take good care of him because he is my favorite toy".

3. Both Conditions. (One minute after the experimenter returns to the room). "What do
you think happened to make Elmo's am1come off?" (Experimenter pauses for child's
response). "That's too bad, Elmo is my favorite toy." (Experimenter again pauses). "It's

OK, Elmo was already broken, so it's not your fault." (The experimenter will continue to
reassure the child if necessary).

Appendix E

Coding System for Emotional and Behavioral Responses

Coding System
Three periods will be coded for each subject and coders will rate the overall emotional
reactions.
1. Final minute of warm-up period: This will be coded from one minute prior to when
the experimenter begins to put Elmo back into the toy box. This period should end
when the experimenter says that she has to get somethingldo some work in the other
room.
2. Experimental Condition: This will be coded when the child first notices that Elmo's
arm is broken. This period ends when the experimenter first returns to the room. In
some instances, the experimenter will return briefly to remind the child to play with
the doll. In these cases, coding should not take place until after the experimenter
leaves and the toy breaks. This period will also end if the child leaves the room.

3. Post Experiment: Coding will begin when the experimenter returns to the room and
is sitting at the table with the child. If the child has left the room, coding begins when
the child and experimenter return to the room. This period has two parts:
1) Before prompt: when the experimenter first enters, and
2) After prompt: when the experimenter prompts the child by saying "What
happened to make Elmo's arm fall off' and "That's too bad, he's my favorite toy.
Coding ends when the experimenter tells the child that the toy was already broken.
For example, the experimenter may say, "I think I made a mistake."
4. Overall Emotional Reaction: This is coded from the beginning for period 2
(experimental condition) to the end of period 3 (post experiment).
For each period, behaviors and emotions will be coded as listed on the coding sheets.
Please be sure to record all instances of these emotional expressions and behaviors when
they occur. Finally, it is important that you not try to form hypotheses about these
behaviors and emotions. These codes will be used in ways that are not evident simply
from viewing these tapes.

Behavioral Measure
Latency to repair

Operational Definitions of Behavioral Codes
Definition
Number of seconds before attempting to repair the toy

Repairing the arm

Tries to fix the arm, whether the child is successfU1 or not

Latency to comment

Number of seconds before verbalizing that the toy is broken

"Telling" E about the a m

Deliberately shows the E the broken arm and/or
verbalizes that the arm is broken

Latency to Gaze

Number of seconds before the child looks at the
experimenter's face. This does not include when the door
first opens or when the experimenter first returns to the
room.

Gaze aversion

Looking at E then looking away toward any insignificant
object (i.e., not at the toy). This includes looking at the
ceiling, toward a comer, or at their laps.

Toy avoidance

Number of seconds with body turned away from the toy.
Moves body fiom the direction of the toy.

Experimenter avoidance

Number of seconds with body turned away fiom
experimenter after the experimenter re-enters the room

Leave

Number of occurrences where the child tries to leave room
or asks to leave the room.

Affection

Number of occurrences where the child hugs, kisses, or pats
the toy

Aggression

Number of occurrences where the child pushes, throws, or
tries to destroy the toy

MinimizesIDenies

Denies responsibility for the mishap. Acts as though or says
that the toy still works and/or says that they "Didn't do it,"
or claims that something else is responsible (e.g., makes up
an excuse).

Confess

Child explains that the toy is broken, says "I broke" or "I
pulled his arm off'

Self-comfort

Thumb sucking, finger in mouth, biting lips

Operational Definitions of Emotion Codes

Affective
Category

Facial

Vocal

Postural

JOY

smiling, wrinkling
around eyes

giggling, increased
pitch, laughing

relaxed muscles,
loose posture

Anger

narrowed eyes, lips
pressed and narrow

harsh, loud

tightened muscles,
clenched fists

Sadness

eyes lowered, lips
turned down

softened tone and
volume, crying

sunken posture,
head down

Tension/
worry

alert, nervous twitches,
tense facial muscles,
brow may be lowered,
eyes may shift rapidly

strained, nervous,
tense

fidgety, tense posture,
may get up from chair

Neutral

calm, no major activity

calm, relaxed,
not excited

calm, attentive

Overall Rating: Rate the overall quality of the child's emotional reaction to the
experiment and the prompting of the experimenter. Rate each child according to either of
the following 2 categories, but not both:
a. Regulated affect
b. Dysregulated affect

Regulated affect - emotion that contributes to the continuation or flow of activity.
Dysregulated affect - emotion that disrupts activity

GENDER

CODERS INITIALS
Final minute of warm-up period
Emotion

Anger
Sadness
Fear

Blends (specify)

Gaze Aversion (seconds)
Avoiding E (seconds)
Self comfort (# of occurrences)

Seconds

Experimental Condition
Emotion

Seconds

Anger
Sadness
Fear
Tension/Worry
Blends (specify)

Code

Seconds

Total Time

Toy avoidance
I

Code

I Occurrences

Leave

I

Aggression

1

Self-Comfort

I

Mild/Full

Post Experiment
Emotion

Seconds

I

Mild/Full

JOY

Anger
Sadness
Fear

Blends (specify)

Code

beconds

Total Time

l Occurrences

Code
Leave

I

Latency to comment

I

Affection
I

Latency to gaze
Toy avoidance

I

Gaze aversion

I

I
I

Aggression
I

Self-comfort

Experimenter avoidance1

Minimizes/Denies

Confess

Y

before prompt
after prompt

Y

N

before prompt

N

after prompt

Y

N

Y N

Overall Rating of Emotional Reactions
(circle one)
Regulated

Dysregulated
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